오는 6월 9일 (화) 16시 30분에 예정된 세미나 일정을 안내드리고자 합니다.

이번 학기 마지막 세미나이므로 많은 참여 부탁드립니다.

- 일시: 2026년 6월 9일 (화요일) 16:30 - 17:45

- 장소: 경영관 33402

*요일과 장소가 기존과 다르니 확인 부탁드립니다.

- 발표자: Wing Suen 교수님

Title: Dynamic pricing of information: belief divergence and surplus extraction

Abstract: A data seller offers a dynamic payment schedule for a sequence of experiments to a privately informed buyer. Different buyer types face different expected costs for the same payment schedule because of their different beliefs. This payment gap can be optimized to reduce information rent. Dynamic mechanisms can strictly increase seller revenue compared to the optimal static mechanism, and in some environments can even extract full surplus. We obtain a full characterization of optimal dynamic mechanisms, which can take the simple form of one binary experiment at each stage. Payments are back-loaded and experiments become progressively more informative over stages.