The Korean Society of Analytic Philosophy 2024 Fall Conference, co-hosted with the Institute for Philosophy and Liberal Arts at the Department of Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University, will be held on Saturday, December 14, from 1:55 PM to 5:50 PM in Room 31503, Toegye Humanities Hall, Sungkyunkwan University. 

The details are as follows:

Date: Saturday, December 14, 2024 (1:55 PM – 5:50 PM)
Venue: Room 31503, 5th Floor, Toegye Humanities Hall, Sungkyunkwan University

Schedule:

1:55–2:00
Opening Remarks: Shin Kim (President, Korean Society of Analytic Philosophy)

<Part 1>

2:00–2:55 Kyutae Kang (Seoul National University)
             A Critique of Perceptualism about Meaning: Based on an Empirical Study of Visual Word Form Areas

2:55–3:50 Beyong Deok Lee (Sungkyunkwan University)
            Which is More Fundamental: Reasons or Reasoning?

<Part 2>

4:00–4:55 Jeonggyu Lee (Sungkyunkwan University)
              Group Names are Ordinary Names

4:55–5:50 Philolab (Junyeol Kim, Nikolaj Pedersen, SeongSoo Park, Dongyong Choi, Ana Ha), Representative: Junyeol Kim
               Is the Knowledge that Hesperus is Phosphorus Propositional Knowledge about Venus?

Kyutae Kang
Title: 의미에 대한 지각주의 비판: 시각 단어 형태 영역에 대한 경험적 연구를 바탕으로
Abstract: 의미에 대한 지각주의에 따르면, 익숙한 언어로 된 발화를 듣거나 글을 읽을 때 우리는 의미를 지각 경험한다. 다시 말해 우리는 발화의 음성적 특성을 듣거나 글자의 모양을 보고 의미를 추론하지 않고, 청각 혹은 경험을 통해 의미를 직접적으로 경험한다. 나는 지각주의에 대해, 시각 단어 형태 영역(Visual Word Form Area)에 대한 신경과학 연구에 근거를 둔 반론을 제시한다. 시각 단어 형태 영역은 의미를 처리하지 않으며, 의미를 처리하기 전 영역이다. 또한, 시각 단어 형태 영역은 지각 경험의 신경상관자가 아니며, 지각 경험의 신경상관자 이후 영역이다. 따라서, 시각으로 들어온 글 정보는 뇌에서 지각 경험의 신경상관자, 시각 단어 형태 영역, 의미 처리 영역 순서로 전달된다. 결론적으로, 의미는 지각 경험 형성 이후에 처리되므로 지각 경험에 표상되지 않는다.

Byeong Deok Lee
Title: Which is more fundamental: reasons or reasoning?
초록: Which is more fundamental: reasons or reasoning? The reasons-first view asserts that reasons are more fundamental than reasoning, while the reasoning-first view claims the opposite. In this paper, I argue that neither reasons nor reasoning is more fundamental than the other. In addition, drawing on a Sellarsian social practice theory of justification, I explain why neither reasons nor reasoning is more fundamental. Moreover, I argue that the fact that neither is more fundamental does not pose any serious problem for a Sellarsian social practice of justification, which is a coherence theory of justification. Although we cannot provide a reductive account of reasons and reasoning, we can offer conceptual explications of these concepts. Besides, within our social practice of justification, we can, at least in principle, determine what currently counts as good reasons and good reasoning.

Jeonggyu Lee
Title: Group Names are Ordinary Names
Abstract: This paper deals with the semantics of names for social groups. My primary aim is to argue that social group names, such as “Blackpink” and “Real Madrid,” are ordinary names, such as “Biden” and “Mona Lisa”: like other ordinary names, a social group name directly refers to an object, whatever it may be, and its semantic content is the object itself. I first present some compelling evidence supporting the view that group names are ordinary names. Then, I introduce what I will call extensionalism on social groups, along with extensionalists’ usual strategy for addressing the main objections to their view. This strategy relies on the semantic claim that social group terms, including group names, are flexible role terms, more akin to definite descriptions than ordinary names. I criticize such a strategy by arguing that there is no convincing reason to regard group names as role terms and that the strategy itself rather creates some tension with extensionalism. The lesson, I conclude, is that when we examine the nature of a social group, it is methodologically advisable to use a group name and investigate the object referred to by it.

Philolab (Junyeol Kim, Nikolaj Pedersen, SeongSoo Park, Dongyong Choi, Ana Ha), Representative: Junyeol Kim
Title: Is the Knowledge that Hesperus is Phosphorus Propositional Knowledge about Venus?
Abstract: We develop an argument that the knowledge of identity cannot be propositional knowledge. We start with several assumptions about identity, identity statements, and knowledge ascriptions, which are arguably plausible and seem to be widely accepted by theorists. If these assumptions are true and the knowledge of identity is propositional knowledge, the knowledge of identity is propositional knowledge of a particular type—the type we call ‘nominal objectual propositional knowledge’. Our argument is that the knowledge of identity cannot fall under the category of nominal objectual propositional knowledge. We argue that denying any of the assumptions about identity, identity statements, and knowledge ascriptions is not plausible, and suggest a way to accommodate the idea that the knowledge of identity is non-propositional.