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- [Faculty] Professor Cho Won-bin, [Weekly Chosun Interview] "Hardline Minority Voices Are Overrepresented Within Parties" NEW
- Hardline Minority Voices Are Overrepresented Within Parties “Judicial politicization calls for reflection from the courts… Toward consensus democracy through a multiparty system” Cho Won-bin, president of the Korean Association of Party Studies and a professor of political science at Sungkyunkwan University who also heads the Center for Good Democracy, has consistently warned about the dangers of political polarization. As he had cautioned, extreme confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties escalated into a declaration of martial law; although it was later lifted, tensions have only intensified. South Korea’s democracy, shaped by a culture of fandom politics and a winner-takes-all electoral system, is inherently vulnerable to political polarization. The recent push toward what is described as the “politicization of the judiciary,” led by the government and ruling party, has also emerged within this broader context. A scholar of political institutions, Cho believes that the solution ultimately lies in changing the structure. He argues that increasing proportionality in the electoral system to encourage a multiparty system, enhancing citizens’ sense of political efficacy through broader participation in decision-making processes, and ultimately transitioning to a “consensus democracy” are essential. South Korea, preoccupied with holding nationwide elections almost every year, has largely postponed such discussions. Even in this year’s local elections, the National Assembly had yet to finalize electoral districts until just two months before the vote. Cho was interviewed on March 31 at his office at Sungkyunkwan University in Jongno District, Seoul. — Policy issues are overshadowed in the local elections. Are there still agendas worth watching? “Each region has important issues, but the problem is that they are not clearly visible. Administrative integration, for instance, has seen partial success in South Jeolla Province and Gwangju, opening a space to discuss balanced regional development. It is also meaningful that Daegu has emerged as a competitive battleground—an unusual development. Regardless of the election outcome, the post-election period could provide an opportunity to set new regional development agendas. I also have expectations for constitutional reform being pursued alongside the elections. Korea has had limited experience with constitutional amendments and referendums, so this could be an opportunity to encounter such possibilities.” — The political reform committee has also introduced a bill to revive local party chapters. “In the past, abolishing local party chapters symbolized political reform. But today, Korea’s election laws are among the strictest in the world, so the risk of corruption is much lower than before. While Korea excels in procedural democracy, it scores relatively low in participatory democracy. There are simply not many opportunities for political elites and voters to meet. Voters have few chances to participate in politics outside of elections, and reviving local party chapters could serve as a channel to convey local public opinion. Ultimately, it could even make it possible to eliminate state subsidies for political parties.” — With the Democratic Party passing three judiciary-related bills, the ‘politicization of the judiciary’ has become more pronounced. “Previously, what we were seeing was the ‘judicialization of politics,’ where ruling and opposition parties failed to resolve issues politically in the legislature and instead deferred decisions to the courts or the Constitutional Court. While this is irresponsible, the judiciary in such cases typically takes a restrained approach to avoid infringing on legislative authority. However, recent research shows that even in the past, judges’ attitudes have shifted depending on their appointment background or changes in administration. In other words, there has always been room for political judgment within the judiciary, and this tendency is now intensifying.” — Could this be seen as direct political intervention in the judiciary? “Fundamentally, the politicization of the judiciary is a serious problem. In English, this is often referred to as ‘court curbing,’ meaning limiting the power of the courts. While it is within the legislature’s अधिकार, it reflects a strong intent to control the judiciary. For example, if the number of Supreme Court justices increases significantly, who appoints them all? Would they appoint politically neutral figures? And is it realistic to expect that only justices not appointed by the president would handle cases involving the president?” — There used to be a culture of respecting court decisions and accepting procedures. Has that weakened due to polarization? “Yes. If the public strongly criticized such actions, there might at least be some hesitation. But in reality, a majority of citizens do not strongly resist. The judiciary, as part of the democratic system, inevitably reflects the will of voters. This suggests that public distrust toward the judiciary is quite high. When the legislature steps in to make changes and the judiciary merely resists without offering alternatives, it becomes an easy target for political parties and the National Assembly, which are sensitive to public opinion. The passage of the judiciary-related bills is problematic, but one must also question whether the judiciary is seriously reflecting on the distrust it faces.” — You recently said that ‘the growing dominance of an extreme minority is a crisis for Korean democracy.’ What do you mean? “For example, the Democratic Party currently holds a majority of seats in the National Assembly, which gives it democratic legitimacy. However, within both the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, only a small minority expresses strong, influential voices. The issue is that these voices become overrepresented in the policymaking process.” — Does this phenomenon contribute to political polarization? “It is a chicken-and-egg problem. Is polarization driven by political elites, or are politicians merely reflecting the preferences of voters? It is not a one-sided process. Under our electoral system, even a single additional vote can lead to a significant victory, so politicians mobilize voters according to their interests. Over time, this leads voters themselves to experience emotional polarization. Political elites then end up following this atmosphere. Since both the president and members of the National Assembly are elected through a simple plurality system, the system itself contributes to polarization.” — Can electoral reform reduce polarization? “There are too many single-member districts, resulting in a significant mismatch between vote share and seat share. It is time to consider a regional proportional representation system. If proportional representatives are elected by region, it would better align votes with seats and allow minority parties to be represented even in regions like Yeongnam and Honam. This would naturally lead to a multiparty system, and if no single party secures a majority, it would encourage cooperation.” — What about the structure of power? “Since citizens want to directly choose their leader, the presidential system still suits Korea. However, the current single five-year term prevents voters from evaluating a president, so a four-year renewable term could be considered. At the same time, presidential powers could be reduced while strengthening the National Assembly. For example, the Board of Audit and Inspection could be placed under the National Assembly. In the long term, election cycles should also be aligned.” — Koreans show strong political interest. “Korea has high voter turnout and frequent public demonstrations. People have a strong desire to participate, but there are few opportunities beyond voting. Something is needed to sustain citizens’ sense of political efficacy between elections. Reviving local party chapters is one option, as are town hall meetings. I once conducted an experimental study: on sensitive local issues, opinions are often divided along partisan lines. However, citizens who had even minimal direct participation in the decision-making process showed significantly less polarization. In fact, implementing this kind of substantive or consensus democracy is the way to address polarization. When we first established the Center for Good Democracy ten years ago, people laughed and asked whether there was such a thing as ‘bad democracy.’ Now they say the name was well chosen. Foreign scholars often ask how Korea can still be considered a young democracy when it appears to be a well-established one. Yet according to the latest V-Dem index, the level of democracy in the United States has fallen significantly below that of Korea this year. Democracy does not function well if left unattended. In an era where face-to-face interaction is declining, polarization is bound to deepen. Ultimately, what matters is institutionalizing opportunities for voter participation and allowing citizens to experience them.”
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- 작성일 2026-04-15
- 조회수 52
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- [Faculty] Professor Cho Won-bin, [Hankook Ilbo Column] "What Does Korea Mean to Young Ugandans?" NEW
- What Does Korea Mean to Young Ugandans? On March 21, 2026 (local time), Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni attends a groundbreaking ceremony for the Kisumu–Malaba Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project in Kisumu. AFP–Yonhap News In late February, I spent a week in Uganda, traveling across the country to assess its January presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, as well as to hear firsthand how Korea’s development cooperation is perceived on the ground. From the moment I left Entebbe International Airport, I was struck by the sheer number of campaign posters lining the roads. President Museveni, elected to a seventh term, appeared on them looking far younger than his 81 years. Posters of parliamentary and local candidates still covered walls and streets, as if the election had only just ended. The ruling party won by a landslide, with President Museveni securing 72 percent of the vote. Yet the opposition refused to accept the results, urging supporters to reject what they called a fraudulent election. In the days leading up to the vote, the government had shut down the internet and deployed armed soldiers in major cities—measures that left many voters feeling uneasy, even fearful. And yet, in Kampala, the opposition candidate won the mayoral race, a small but telling sign that public discontent had found its way into the ballot box. My first stop was Makerere University, one of Africa’s most prestigious institutions. There, I delivered a lecture on the state of democracy in Korea. I was warmly welcomed by bright and curious students, graduate researchers, and faculty members—young people who will shape Uganda’s future. For many of them, having lived their entire lives under a single president, Korea’s political system raised profound questions. The idea that a president could change every five years was, in itself, striking. Even more surprising were the stories of Korea’s democratic journey—from the June Democratic Struggle in 1987 to the 2016–2017 Candlelight Protests, and more recent protests that led to presidential impeachment. Again and again, students asked me the same question: How was it possible for citizens to change their president in a peaceful way? It was a question that revealed not only curiosity, but also a quiet sense of distance from such a reality. The next part of my journey took me to Iganga, a rural area about two hours from the capital. There, I reviewed the results of a five-year health system strengthening project supported by Korea International Cooperation Agency. A senior local official spoke with genuine appreciation, asking me to convey their gratitude to KOICA and the Korean government. At a local health center improved through the project, the director personally walked me through the renovations, speaking with visible pride about the services they can now provide. What stayed with me most, however, were the faces of the patients—especially the mothers resting at the facility. Their quiet smiles spoke more clearly than any report or statistic. This visit to Uganda made one thing unmistakably clear to me: Korea’s experiences—both its democratic struggles and its development efforts—are not distant stories. They are being felt, questioned, and, in some cases, quietly hoped for by young people and communities far beyond its borders.
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- 작성일 2026-04-14
- 조회수 47
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- Sungkyun China Institute Hosts “2026 Korea–China Youth Dialogue” at Sungkyunkwan University NEW
- “Anti-China and Anti-Korea Sentiments Are Structural, Not Emotional”: Youth Dialogue Seeks Solutions Through Direct Engagement Participants of the “2026 Korea–China Youth Dialogue” pose for a group photo at the 600th Anniversary Hall of Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul on the 10th. Lee Hee-ok, honorary professor at Sungkyunkwan University, is fifth from the right in the back row. (Provided by the Sungkyun China Institute) The Sungkyun China Institute hosted the “2026 Korea–China Youth Dialogue” on the afternoon of the 10th at the 600th Anniversary Hall of Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul. Moderated by Lee Hee-ok, honorary professor at Sungkyunkwan University, the event brought together ten Korean and Chinese youth participants to discuss the theme of “mutual animosity and pathways toward mitigation.” Participants broadly agreed that anti-foreign sentiment should not be understood as a matter of individual emotion alone, but as a structural issue shaped by media environments, political dynamics, and information ecosystems. The Korean presentations opened with stark statistics. Citing a Pew Research Center survey, Kyonggi University student Jang Ho-jin noted that favorable views of China among South Koreans plummeted from 65.0% in 2002 to just 19.0% in 2025. In another survey of 2,000 Seoul residents, 65.5% identified Chinese people as the “least favorable foreign group,” a figure that far exceeded that of Japan at 17.3%. The most frequently cited reasons were “high perceived crime risk” (79.9%) and “threats to social order” (71.8%). However, Jang argued that such perceptions are not strongly grounded in lived experience. “In 2020, crimes committed by Korean nationals amounted to 2,815 per 100,000 people, compared to 1,502 among foreign residents,” he said, adding that “the perception of Chinese people as dangerous is reinforced more by information flows than by personal experience.” Chinese participants presented comparable findings. He Yangjie, a master’s graduate student at Sungkyunkwan University, cited a 2025 survey from Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), in which Chinese respondents rated their favorability toward South Korea at just 2.61 out of 5. Participants present their findings at the “2026 Korea–China Youth Dialogue” held at Sungkyunkwan University on the 10th. (Provided by the Sungkyun China Institute) Other Korean presenters, including Park Jung-hyun and Noh Hyeon-ji from the University of Seoul, analyzed the structural mechanisms behind the spread of anti-Chinese sentiment. They described a cycle in which sensational content is produced in online communities and 일부 media outlets, amplified by platform algorithms, and then reproduced through user engagement such as comments, views, and “likes.” Park noted that after viewing posts about China’s visa-free entry policy, his recommendation feed became saturated with negative content, including baseless claims such as human trafficking networks. Yet official data showed that Chinese-related crime in the three months following the visa-free policy actually decreased by 9.8% compared to the same period the previous year. Sungkyunkwan University student Im Ga-eun highlighted the paradox of simultaneous hostility and enthusiasm toward the same country. As of 2024, 47.1% of Korean smartphone users had installed Chinese e-commerce apps such as Temu and AliExpress, while also consuming Chinese food like mala-tang and watching Chinese dramas on Netflix. Despite this cultural and economic engagement, political hostility toward China remained strong. “The key question is not how to directly change emotions, but how to redesign the structures that produce them,” she said. Chinese presenters similarly located the roots of anti-Korean sentiment in a chain linking politics, media, and public emotion. Yang Xingxin, a graduate student studying in Seoul, analyzed over two decades of bilateral media coverage and found that positive reporting tends to dominate during periods of stable political relations, while negative coverage expands during times of tension. He pointed to the 2016–2017 deployment of the THAAD missile defense system as a turning point. He also cited cases in which misleading social media posts—such as a Chinese user falsely labeling streets in Guangzhou as Seoul’s Jongno district—went uncorrected, fueling outrage on Chinese platforms and reinforcing existing stereotypes. Kookmin University student Liang Yiting referenced a controversy involving alleged restrictions on Chinese customers at a café in Seoul’s Seongsu-dong district. “At first, I felt discomfort and anger,” he said. “But after examining the sources and dissemination process, I realized how easily individual cases are generalized in public discourse.” Han Yang University student Wang Dezhen added that inaccurate translations or selectively curated comments often construct distorted perceptions of South Korea among Chinese audiences. Another presentation by Seoul National University of Science and Technology student Luo Shengchan examined the role of online gaming and esports in shaping anti-Korean sentiment. He explained that Chinese players often connect to Korean servers due to lower latency, where language barriers and lack of coordination can lead to frustration and social exclusion. Over time, these experiences are generalized into collective stereotypes within online communities. Esports, he added, can further amplify such emotions at a national scale. “Players are judged not only by performance but also by how well they adapt to foreign fan cultures,” he said. “However, when shared goals are established, gaming can also become a space for cross-border solidarity.” Across both sides, participants consistently identified “direct experience” as the most effective remedy. Han Yang University student Lee Ju-young cited a January study trip to China involving 20 undergraduates. “Most students began the trip with preconceived notions, but after meeting people in person, their perceptions became significantly more positive,” he said. Yang Xingxin added that political developments can quickly influence public sentiment. He noted that following a meeting between South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping in January 2026, the tone of Chinese social media comments shifted noticeably. In terms of policy recommendations, Jang Ho-jin proposed restricting monetization of hate-driven content and establishing a joint Korea–China fact-checking system. Park Jung-hyun and Noh Hyeon-ji suggested designing exchange programs in the form of “escape rooms” that expose participants to algorithmic bias and encourage critical reflection on how online platforms shape perception.
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- 작성일 2026-04-13
- 조회수 52
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- [Faculty] Professor Lee Sook-jong, [Seoul Economic Daily] Can Middle Powers Forge Solidarity in an Era of Great-Power Politics? NEW
- Can Middle Powers Forge Solidarity in an Era of Great-Power Politics? At this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, the most closely watched speech was delivered by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. Declaring that the Western-led “rules-based international order” has already unraveled, he urged middle powers—including Canada—to join forces in crafting new strategies and rules. While many found his diagnosis compelling, the more difficult question—how such coordination is to be realized—remains insufficiently addressed. Middle powers are typically defined in terms of both their relative position in economic and military capabilities and their behavior in the international system. Yet there is no agreed positional threshold that clearly delineates them. Conventionally, the term has been used to describe members of the G20 excluding the G7. More recently, however, even some G7 countries—apart from the United States, China, and Russia—have begun to identify themselves as middle powers. From a behavioral perspective, middle powers are generally understood as states that respect international law and norms, promote cooperation, and mediate among competing interests, thereby contributing to the stable functioning of multilateral systems. The environment for middle-power diplomacy has changed profoundly over the past three decades. In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, a relatively stable U.S.-led liberal order enabled the emergence of first-generation middle powers such as Canada, Australia, and the Nordic countries. In the 2000s, a second generation—comprising non-Western states such as South Korea and Indonesia—came to the fore. During this period, the United States, within a shared interest in sustaining the liberal order, supported the expansion of middle-power diplomacy. That landscape has since shifted. China’s rise accelerated after the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s leadership in 2012, and strategic competition between the United States and China intensified following the inauguration of the Trump administration in 2017, expanding across military, economic, and technological domains. As rivalry deepened, the strategic space available to middle powers narrowed, and discussions of middle-power diplomacy lost momentum. Recently, however, such discussions have reemerged. Renewed disregard for international law, tariff pressures, and diplomatic frictions with allies under a second Trump administration have prompted middle powers to reconsider collective responses—seeking, in effect, a safety net to bypass or compensate for a United States increasingly seen as destabilizing the rules-based order. It is a striking reversal that underscores how dramatically the international landscape has changed. For middle powers within the liberal camp to restore a rules-based multilateral system, a degree of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis great powers is essential. Yet countries with deep security and economic dependence on the United States face clear constraints. In the transatlantic sphere, as the value-based foundations of the alliance come under strain, NATO members—led by Germany and France—have begun efforts to reduce reliance on the United States within the framework of collective defense. Such efforts, however, will take considerable time to materialize. In Asia, where no comparable collective defense structure exists, the challenge is even more acute. South Korea and Japan, long reliant on bilateral alliances with the United States, remain politically constrained in advancing discussions of security autonomy. Nevertheless, the redeployment of U.S. forces and assets—driven by Washington’s “strategic flexibility,” including shifts toward the Middle East—has prompted Asian allies to reconsider the necessity of greater autonomy. The recent Middle East crisis, triggered by escalating tensions among the United States, Israel, and Iran, presents another critical test for middle-power coordination. Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a so-called “group of 22 countries”—including South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and NATO members—has sought to explore joint responses. Yet requests from President Trump to dispatch naval forces have largely been declined: NATO has argued that such actions fall outside its collective defense provisions, while Japan has cited constitutional constraints. It would be neither prudent nor rational to commit to cooperation that lacks strategic justification merely to rebut accusations of “useless allies.” At the same time, given the principle of freedom of navigation and the risk of a widening energy crisis, inaction is becoming increasingly difficult to justify. As confusion deepens amid divergent signals from Washington and Tehran over escalation or de-escalation, middle powers must play a more active role—both in preventing further escalation and in managing the post-conflict order. At a time when the mediating capacity of the United Nations has significantly weakened, their responsibilities have grown correspondingly heavier. As more states turn toward self-help, the need for cooperation becomes all the more urgent. Middle powers must move beyond defensive responses to great-power politics and exercise diplomatic leadership—persuading and organizing international cooperation to restore a rules-based order. In particular, engagement with the “Global South,” including countries such as India, Brazil, and Mexico, will be essential in checking the excesses of great-power rivalry. Individually limited, middle powers become powerful when they act together.
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- 작성일 2026-04-13
- 조회수 55
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- [Student] Department of Child Psychology and Education Underscores Global Competitiveness with Three SSCI Publications
- Department of Child Psychology and Education Underscores Global Competitiveness with Three SSCI Publications ▲ (From left) Graduate students Lee Seo-woo, Kang Ran, and Zhang Zekai, Department of Child Psychology and Education The Department of Child Psychology and Education (Chair: Professor Lee Tae-kyung) is reinforcing its global research competitiveness through the publication of three SSCI-indexed journal articles by BK-supported graduate students, alongside notable international career placements. In particular, a series of recent publications in leading SSCI journals highlights the department’s growing academic presence on the global stage. Lee Seo-woo published a study examining adolescents’ psychopathological symptoms and resilience processes in the Journal of Youth and Adolescence (ranked in the top 19.6% in Developmental Psychology, 2025). Kang Ran’s research, which analyzes stress interactions and parenting efficacy within multicultural families, has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Family Psychology (top 31.1% in Family Studies, 2026). Meanwhile, Zhang Zekai published a study exploring the relationships among cultural stress, adaptation processes, and mental health in multicultural adolescents in Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology (top 2.5% in Ethnic Studies, 2024). Under the supervision of Professor Lee Tae-kyung, the research group has consistently produced publications in prominent international journals, particularly in the field of adolescent development. In addition, recent graduates of the department (advisors: Professor Song Hana and Professor Lee Tae-kyung) have secured faculty positions at universities in the United States, China, and Mongolia. Others have advanced into industry, including positions at the global technology company Tencent. The department is also actively expanding its international research collaborations and academic exchanges through established networks with leading institutions, including University of Texas at Austin, Vanderbilt University, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Victoria University of Wellington, and Mongolian National University of Education.
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- 작성일 2026-04-07
- 조회수 128
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- [Faculty] Professor Yoon Bi, [Kyunghyang Shinmun Column] Criticism for Yoo Si-min
- Criticism for Yoo Si-min A recent appearance by Yoo Si-min on a political YouTube channel has stirred considerable debate. At its core is his “ABC theory,” which he used to frame internal tensions within the Democratic Party of Korea over prosecutorial reform. According to Yoo, the party can be divided into three groups: a core base of loyal supporters (A), a group whose backing depends on self-interest and convenience (B), and a third group representing their overlap (C). Yoo seems to have had in mind the emerging “New Lee Jae-myung” faction, whose rise has clashed with the party’s long-standing loyalists and their networks. His ABC framework is a variation of the theory that political support generally rests on two axes: conviction and self-interest. Consider history: before World War II, democracy was far from the norm. But after the war, with the United States rising as a global superpower, democratic systems spread rapidly. By the end of the 20th century, even countries once indifferent—or even hostile—to democratic ideals began to embrace the label. For Yoo Si-min, politics is a matter of conviction His so-called “ABC theory” imposes a moral hierarchy reducing the diversity and complexity of real-world politics to little more than labels Not every politician or citizen in these nations was necessarily a true believer in democratic principles. Many pursued democracy for pragmatic reasons, seeking the benefits offered under the global dominance of the U.S.—a support base highly contingent and vulnerable to shifts in circumstances. On its face, Yoo’s ABC classification is not particularly controversial. The storm comes from how he applies it. He maps this framework directly onto present political conflicts, casting strong support for prosecutorial reform as a matter of conviction, while reading opposing positions as opportunistic self-interest. In doing so, he risks flattening a complex political reality into rigid labels, stripping away nuance and variation. It is not difficult to understand why Yoo might see things this way. In a society long shaped by authoritarian rule, standing on the side of democracy required extraordinary resolve. Under the Yushin Constitution of the 1970s and the military regimes of the 1980s, advocating democracy was not merely a matter of opinion—it often demanded putting one’s life and future on the line. Figures like Yoo, who stood at the front lines of that struggle, did so with immense determination. Others could pursue safer, conventional paths—burying themselves in exams or professional careers, even under the rule of Chun Doo-hwan. Yoo himself, an elite university graduate from Daegu, could have easily aligned with the mainstream establishment of his era. For him, and for those who walked similar paths, democracy naturally spoke in the language of conviction. Consequently, a deep skepticism toward those who support and abandon causes purely out of self-interest is understandable. Yoo’s ABC theory reflects this mindset. He appears particularly wary of new political actors—some of whom had not consistently aligned with Lee Jae-myung or the Democratic Party in the past—now attempting to claim influence alongside, and in competition with, long-standing loyalists. Even with this context, his application of the framework risks distortion. In debates over prosecutorial reform, the ABC theory can label rather than analyze. Those who disagree are morally ranked and implicitly judged as lesser. This explains the unease it generates, not just among Democratic Party supporters, but across broader audiences. Political commentary in a democracy requires caution: differing positions should not be oversimplified or hierarchized. By this measure, Yoo’s approach falls short. The name Yoo Si-min carries enduring weight in South Korea, particularly for those who once took to the streets defending democracy. The intensity of support—and criticism—reflects this legacy. Expecting him to demonstrate measured thought and responsible speech is not a demand limited to Democratic Party supporters. Professor Yoon Bi, Sungkyunkwan University
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- 작성일 2026-04-06
- 조회수 106
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- [Faculty] Professor Lee Jae-guk, [JoongAng Ilbo Column] "When the Distance Between Innovation and Rules Grows Too Wide"
- When the Distance Between Innovation and Rules Grows Too Wide Lee Jae-guk, professor at Sungkyunkwan University She was a 44-year-old mother of three. On a three-day trip to London, she encountered something she had never seen before—a massive object hurtling toward her. Startled, she tried to fend it off with her umbrella. The heavy machine ran her over. She died at the scene. This was 1896, the moment Bridget Driscoll became the first person in history to be killed by an automobile while walking. There were no clear distinctions between roadway and sidewalk, and even the concept of a driver’s license did not yet exist. The coroner lamented “the difficulty of adapting old rules to new circumstances,” adding, “I hope such a thing never happens again.” Yet the trial concluded it was a mere accident. No responsibility was assigned—to neither the driver nor the manufacturer. Technology always outruns the rules Social media mirrors the trajectory of tobacco companies Harms are obscured rather than disclosed Regulation arrives only after human lives are lost The episode stands as a textbook example of the lag between technological innovation and regulation. When the automobile first appeared in 1886, society scarcely understood the risks it would bring. There was little awareness of safety measures, and virtually no regulation. It was not until the 1920s that roads and sidewalks were separated, the 1930s that crosswalks and speed limits were introduced, and as late as 1970 that seat belts became mandatory. Technology reshaped society; rules scrambled to catch up. The pattern persists. A woman in her twenties in the United States, Kaylee, has filed suit against Instagram and YouTube. Exposed to social media from a young age, she alleges that she developed addiction, depression, and body dysmorphic disorder. Recently, a jury acknowledged that these platforms were designed to maximize user engagement. Notifications, “likes,” autoplay, and infinite scroll—features engineered to exploit human psychology—were found to foster compulsive use. Should the verdict stand, Meta Platforms and Google could be ordered to pay substantial punitive damages. And many more lawsuits are likely to follow. The ruling comes five years after revelations that Meta was aware of Instagram’s harmful effects on teenage users yet failed to act. The trajectory of social media companies closely resembles that of tobacco firms. Beginning in the 1950s, lawsuits against tobacco companies in the United States rarely resulted in victories for consumers for decades. Only after whistleblowers exposed internal knowledge did massive settlements emerge in 1998. By then, millions had already become addicted to nicotine, and countless lives had been lost to diseases such as lung cancer. Today, parallels are emerging in the field of artificial intelligence. Much as tobacco companies concealed the addictive properties of nicotine, AI firms appear to be sidelining those who raise concerns about risk. In 2020, Google effectively dismissed the head of its ethics team, who had warned about the dangers of large language models. Meta Platforms dismantled its responsible AI team in 2022. Microsoft eliminated its ethics and society team in 2023. At OpenAI, the head of a safety team resigned in 2024 after publicly criticizing company policies; the team itself was soon dissolved. Faced with a choice between speed and safety, Big Tech has shown remarkable consistency. Technology, by its nature, moves ahead. But when the rules that follow lag too far behind, the gap is inevitably filled with human cost. Driscoll. Teenagers ensnared by social media. Countless victims of tobacco-related disease. South Korea takes pride in passing a comprehensive AI framework, positioning itself as the second country in the world to do so. Yet the substance falls short of its ambition. In Europe, companies found in violation can face fines of up to 7 percent of global revenue. In Korea, penalties amount to little more than modest administrative fines. Enforcement is further delayed by a grace period of at least one year, limiting any immediate impact. Definitions of “high-impact AI” remain vague, and there is no obligation to disclose training data. The law’s primary emphasis, after all, is industrial promotion. Meanwhile, the country is quietly preparing what could become the world’s first legislation on military artificial intelligence. Even as it affirms the necessity of human oversight, it simultaneously leaves room for deploying incomplete technologies without such safeguards. Amid slogans of “K-defense” and ambitions to rank among the world’s top three AI powers, voices of concern are reduced to little more than a whisper. On the day Driscoll died, there were just 12 gasoline-powered vehicles in Britain, traveling at no more than 6 kilometers per hour. Today, as Kaylee’s lawsuit unfolds, social media and AI permeate every corner of life, advancing at speeds far beyond human control. By the time we say, “I hope such a thing never happens again,” after the damage is done, it is already too late. The dead do not return.
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- 작성일 2026-04-06
- 조회수 100
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- [Faculty] Professor Lee Jung-eun Named Fellow of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
- Professor Lee Jung-eun Named Fellow of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Professor Lee Jung-eun of the Department of Child and Adolescent Studies in the College of Social Sciences has been selected as a 2026 Fellow of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities—widely regarded as the world’s leading academic authority in the field of intellectual and developmental disabilities. The distinction is particularly significant as Professor Lee becomes the first Korean scholar to receive this honor. Founded in 1876, the AAIDD is the oldest and largest professional organization dedicated to intellectual and developmental disabilities, with a history spanning nearly 150 years. The association has played a pivotal role in establishing globally recognized definitions, classification systems, and support frameworks for intellectual disabilities, and is widely acknowledged for setting international standards in the field. The designation of Fellow is one of the AAIDD’s highest honors. It is awarded to members with at least seven years of professional experience who demonstrate exceptional scholarly achievement, sustained leadership, and innovative contributions to the advancement of research and practice in intellectual and developmental disabilities. Candidates undergo a rigorous evaluation process before being selected. In an official announcement released on January 7, the AAIDD named Professor Lee among 11 scholars worldwide as Fellows for 2026. Over the course of her career, Professor Lee has dedicated her research to improving the quality of life for children and adolescents with developmental disabilities, as well as their families. Her work—particularly on family-centered interventions—has been published in leading international academic journals, earning her broad recognition in the global research community. Professor Lee will be formally inducted as a Fellow at the AAIDD’s 150th Annual Meeting, to be held in Chicago from June 22 to 24, where she will receive her official certificate of fellowship.
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- 작성일 2026-04-01
- 조회수 176
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- [Faculty] Professor Lee Hee-ok, [Kyunghyang Shinmun Column] Responding to the Iran-Induced Complex Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
- Responding to the Iran-Induced Complex Crisis on the Korean Peninsula The United States carried out a preemptive strike against Iran under the pretext of an “imminent threat.” However, this war has been criticized as a preventive war in violation of international law, lacking justification, domestic and international support, and any clear exit strategy. Indeed, even key U.S. allies, including European countries, are now questioning for whom this war is being fought and what its ultimate objective is. The U.S. airstrikes, contrary to their initial intention of disabling Iran’s military capabilities, ended up targeting key energy and nuclear facilities. Washington has also requested that allies deploy naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz, indicating a willingness to escalate the conflict further. Iran, pushed into a corner, has responded by damaging the energy infrastructure of Gulf states and blocking transport routes, engaging in what may be described as the “politicization of time.” Under these conditions, the war risks becoming a prolonged, low-intensity conflict without regime change in Iran or the elimination of nuclear materials. Global energy prices have already surged, and supply chains for essential components, materials, and minerals have been significantly disrupted. The Iran war is undermining the rules-based international order and generating distrust in U.S. global strategy. Above all, America’s strategic vision—centered on containing China by consolidating its position in the Western Hemisphere and limiting China’s strategic space—is being shaken. This is because resources and strategic attention have been diverted away from China due to the focus on the Middle East. In reality, China is not yet experiencing catastrophic losses from the Iran war. Iran allows the passage of Chinese vessels, China’s dependence on Iranian energy is around 15 percent of its total energy imports, and it also maintains buffer oil reserves. Moreover, when Iranian oil sold in yuan rather than dollars passes through the Strait of Hormuz, it contributes to a relative strengthening of China’s currency position. However, this does not mean that China is the main beneficiary of the war. Unlike the United States, which is largely energy self-sufficient, China remains vulnerable in terms of energy security. If key energy infrastructure in Middle Eastern oil-producing countries is destroyed, recovery would take a long time, and supply chains in petrochemical industries—such as naphtha-based inputs—would also be destabilized. China had aimed to lower its growth target to 4.5–5 percent this year, promote high-tech industrial development as a game changer in its competition with the United States, and achieve a soft landing for the Xi Jinping administration. However, disruptions in energy, components, and materials supply chains would reduce factory utilization rates and further depress an already weakened consumer economy. The effects of this war are also being felt on the Korean Peninsula, located 6,700 kilometers away from Iran. First, the United States has demanded allied contributions, including requests for South Korean naval deployment to the Strait of Hormuz. However, sending troops into what could become a “route of death,” without clear justification and amid likely armed conflict, is an entirely different matter. Therefore, South Korea can hardly go beyond indirect military support or participation in political condemnation of Iran’s blockade of maritime routes. Second, supply chain disruptions originating from China are also expected to affect the Korean economy. If China concentrates the components and materials it has secured on protecting its domestic industries, Korean sectors that depend on Chinese intermediate goods—such as semiconductors and automobiles—may face a serious competitiveness crisis. Moreover, if China resorts to export controls, the situation could become even more uncontrollable. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish a supply chain risk management mechanism by utilizing the current phase of normalization in Korea–China relations. Third, changes originating from North Korea must also be carefully observed. Watching the decapitation of Iran’s leadership, North Korea is likely to further conceal sensitive information, while also becoming more committed to upgrading its nuclear capabilities, particularly after witnessing what it perceives as symbolic rather than substantive support from China and Russia for Iran. While South Korea cannot endorse a strategy of “peace through force” led by the United States while simultaneously advocating peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, it must be able to compensate for security gaps created by the possible redeployment of strategic assets to the Middle East through proactive management of peace on the peninsula. Furthermore, the postponed U.S.–China summit should be leveraged to promote U.S.–North Korea dialogue and connect it to a series of follow-up negotiations. Realistically, North Korea appears to believe that dialogue with the United States is only possible during President Trump’s term, and the United States may also consider such engagement as part of an exit strategy from the Iran conflict. Good governments demonstrate their capabilities in times of crisis. The government has responded by protecting and evacuating overseas citizens in the Middle East, introducing an oil price cap, and securing emergency crude oil imports from the United Arab Emirates. It has also prepared contingency plans such as vehicle rationing schemes in anticipation of further crises. As a result, approval ratings for the president and the government have increased. The problem, however, is that this complex crisis—intertwined with Iran, the United States, and China both directly and indirectly—will continue without a defined timeline. To overcome it, it is necessary to dismantle ministerial silos and establish a more agile system that places problems at the center, mobilizes collective intelligence, and generates optimal policy options. Professor Emeritus Lee Hee-ok, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Sungkyunkwan University
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- 작성일 2026-03-23
- 조회수 323