성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제24회 논문발표회를 1월 9일 (금요일) 오후 2:20~5:50에 퇴계인문관 6층 31604호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다. 

일 시: 2026년 1월 9일 금요일 오후 2:20~5:50
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 6층 604호(#31604)

일 정:
2:20~2:30 등록 및 개회 인사
2:30~3:30 박경남 (카이스트 디지털인문사회과학센터; Loyola University Chicago 박사)
                    Kant’s Doctrine of Right and Rawls’s Political Liberalism
3:40~4:40 하원재 (연세대 박사) 

                    Meaning in Trouble

4:50~5:50 백채영 (서울대; University of Massachusetts, Amherst 박사)
                    Autonomy as Ownership

        
박경남
발표 제목: Kant’s Doctrine of Right and Rawls’s Political Liberalism
초록: The purpose of this paper is to criticize Krassnoff’s independence reading of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. Krassnoff defends the independence thesis that Kant’s political philosophy does not rely on Kant’s moral philosophy by deploying Rawls’s distinction between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism. Krassnoff argues that Kant’s Doctrine of Right should be understood as a form of political liberalism in that the moral claims of the Doctrine of Right concern inherently political values rather than comprehensively moral values, which include non-political values as well as political values. In this paper, I argue that Krassnoff’s attempt to defend the independence thesis by characterizing Kant’s Doctrine of Right as political liberalism is not plausible for the following three interrelated reasons. First, there remains a conceptual conflict between the politically liberal aspects and the strong moral claims that Krassnoff ascribes to Kant’s Doctrine of Right. Second, relatedly, Kant’s Doctrine of Right should be characterized as containing comprehensively moral claims since its strong moral claims concerning the equal freedom of each citizen could not be accepted by citizens who support Hobbesian or other prudentialist theories of political justice. Third, I argue that the failure of Krassnoff’s strategy to defend the independence reading in terms of Rawls’s political liberalism is due in part to Krassnoff’s neglect of the tension between Rawls’s claim that political liberalism is independent of moral philosophy and the strong moral claims that Rawls’s political liberalism nevertheless requires by prioritizing public right over individual interests. 

하원재
발표 제목: Meaning in Trouble
초록: In this papaer, I argue that extension, as traditionally conceived, is not generalizable in the sense required for philosophically fundamental concepts. This yields a dilemma: either abandon the generalizability of the concept or give up the philosophical fundamentality of it. I propose a third route by combining Carnap's idea of extension with a Leibnizian notion of equivalence defined as the predicational equivalence. This proposal implies a view identifying extension with properties, which provides a uniform, generalizable notion of extension.

백채영
발표 제목: Autonomy as Ownership
초록: The relational approach to autonomy holds that autonomy fundamentally depends on one’s social environment. I argue that existing relational accounts face a dilemma: they either set the bar too high, rendering autonomy unattainable, or define it in terms of a self-relationship so permissive that even manipulated or brainwashed actions may count as autonomous. To resolve this, I propose the ownership view of autonomy, which holds that autonomy depends on the degree to which one possesses and exercises ownership over one’s actions. On this view, social relationships shape ownership: when an agent is embedded in a relationship that normatively requires her to relinquish control over her actions, her autonomy is diminished. By tying autonomy to ownership, this account avoids the pitfalls of existing relational theories.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 우인진 / jaegoi53@gmail.com

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 2025년 가을 해외학자 초청강연을 9월 20일(토요일) 오후 4:00~6:00에 퇴계인문관 31511호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 예루살렘 히브리 대학(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)의 Igal Kvart 교수님께서 "A New Pragmatics, with Application to Assertion"라는 제목으로 발표하실 예정입니다. 선생님들과 학생분들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.

발표 제목: A New Pragmatics, with Application to Assertion
초록: In this paper I present a new approach to Pragmatics and a new Pragmatic Theory, with applications to Assertion, Presuppositions and more. The new Pragmatics comes in a new Conceptual Framework. (전체 초록은 맨 아래에서 확인할 수 있습니다.)

Bio: Prof. Igal Kvart is a Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, with an affiliation to Rutgers University. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Pittsburgh with W. Sellars, on counterfactuals. His book A Theory of Counterfactuals (1984) was awarded the Johnsonian Prize by the Journal of Philosophy. He has also published extensively in prestigious journals on topics such as causation, reference, knowledge, pragmatic encroachment, and the new pragmatics.

세부 일정은 다음과 같습니다.

일 시: 2025년 9월 20일 토요일 오후 4:00~6:00
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 5층 511호(#31511)

일 정:
4:00~6:00 Igal Kvart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
                   A New Pragmatics, with Application to Assertion

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 우인진 / jaegoi53@gmail.com

Full Abstract: 

      In this paper I present a new approach to Pragmatics and a new Pragmatic Theory, with applications to Assertion, Presuppositions and more. The new Pragmatics comes in a new Conceptual Framework. The main concepts are:

1. Steering-Thrusts – any Verbal Act (spoken or written or thought) comes with a certain degree of 'steering' the hearer/audience towards adopting a certain content (conveyed by the speaker's Verbal Act).

2. Pragmatic Stances: Types of cognitive states hearers are steered towards. One among others is the Epistemic/informational Pragmatic Stance, with propositional contents – familiar in traditional Pragmatics (Grice, Stalnaker). But there are various others – attitudinal, attentive, Action-Directed, emotive, etc. Their contents need not be propositional.

3. A new set of Norms – comprising Conversational Etiquette. One among them is the familiar Sincerity Norm. It's generalized into the Broad Sincerity Norm. But Conversational Etiquette comprises also other types of norms, not considered in current Pragmatics. The proposed Pragmatics is not governed by Gricean Maxims of Rationality but rather by different special norms of Conversational Etiquette

4. A cognitive state of Posting -- having a certain Pragmatic Stance, which is NORM-CONFERRED by Conversational Etiquette, usually via Steering by a verbal act that makes it PUBLIC. For instance, in steering towards an Epistemic Position, the speaker THEREBY Posts having it.

      Applications: This set of concepts makes it possible to provide a new outlook on what Assertions are – they inherently invoke certain degrees of Steering-Thrust, NOT some epistemic position. So-called Presuppositions turn out to be mental acts of Posting-Without-Steering. (Epistemic) Pragmatic Encroachment, it would follow, DOESN'T EXIST – the underpinning phenomena are Verbal Acts conveying 2 distinct Steering Thrusts, where the Action-Directed Steering Thrust OVERWHELM the epistemic Steering Thrust (in view of strong normative pressures, such as in High Stakes): The phenomenon is PRAGMATIC, not semantic (as in, e.g., Epistemic Contextualism, or Shifty Epistemology). Misleading is a Pragmatic phenomenon – conveying implicit contents that the speaker Posts having but in fact doesn't. Pragmatic Inconsistencies, as in Moorean sentences, involve CONFLICTING STEERING THRUSTS, i.e., in opposite directions (vis-à-vis towards an action, an epistemic position, an attitude, etc.).

       Among many particular and general differences from traditional Pragmatics, note Grice's notion of implicature, which is inexorably interwoven with his set of Maxims (aiming at Rational Cooperation towards a Common Goal), which therefore needs to be replaced by the more neutral and general Implicit Content. The domain of application of STPP is much larger than that of the Gricean Pragmatics. The contents of implicit content need not be propositional (as in Grice and Stalnaker), due to the variety of Pragmatic Stances. So-called Presupposing is characterized precisely via the notions of Steering and Posting.

       In this talk I'll introduce the new Pragmatics, and give a taste (only, due to time constraints) of some of its applications, as mentioned above.

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제23회 논문발표회를 8월 1일(금요일) 오후 2:35~5:55에 퇴계인문관 31409호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다. 

일 시: 2025년 8월 1일 금요일 오후 2:35~5:55
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 4층 409호(#31409)

일 정:
2:35~2:40 등록 및 개회 인사
2:40~3:35 백송이 (성균관대)
                    붉은 트롭은 그 자체로 붉은가
3:40~4:35 한혜정 (제주대) 

                    추구가치성의 두 갈래

4:40~5:55 이병덕 (성균관대)
                    A Kantian Approach to the Problem of Many Hands

            논평: 김상수 (육군사관학교)

백송이
발표 제목: 붉은 트롭은 그 자체로 붉은가
초록: 트롭은 특수화된 속성으로, 다른 개체에 공유되지 않는다는 점에서 보편자와 다르다. 트롭 이론에 따르면, 개체 o가 붉은 것은 그것을 구성하거나 그것이 소유하는 붉음 트롭 r 덕분이다. 그렇다면 이렇게 물을 수 있다: 붉음 트롭은 그 자체로 붉은가? R. Garcia에 따르면, 이 문제와 관련된 특징 근거 방식을 기준으로 트롭은 다음의 두 가지로 이해될 수 있다. 한 가지는, 트롭들을 다른 존재자(즉, 개체)를 특징화하기만 할 뿐 그 자체로는 특징을 가지고 있지 않는 것으로 보는 것이다. 이를 비-자기특징화 트롭(modifier trope, 비-자기예화 트롭)이라 부른다. 다른 한 가지는, 개체들이 어떤 특징들을 가진다고 말할 수 있는 이유는 바로 그것을 구성하는 트롭들이 바로 그 특징에 해당하기 때문이라는 것이다. 이를 자기특징화 트롭(module trope, 자기예화 트롭)이라 부른다. Garcia는 어떤 방식으로 트롭을 이해한다 하더라도, 둘 다 문제가 발생한다고 주장한다. 이에 대해, 나는 그가 제기하는 문제가 트롭을 이해함에 있어서 이론적 기여가 있다고 보고 있으나 트롭 개념의 채택에 있어서는 그가 보다 우호적으로 기울여 있는 비-자기특징화 트롭보다는 자기특징화 트롭이 더 낫다고 판단한다. 이로써, 트롭이론의 동기를 더 잘 살릴 수 있을 뿐만 아니라, 트롭이론이 갖추어야 할 더 나은 이론적 패키지가 무엇인지 역시 제시한다.

한혜정
발표 제목: 추구가치성의 두 갈래
초록: 최근 과학철학계에서 ‘추구가치성(pursuitworthiness)’에 관한 논의가 눈에 띄게 증가하고 있다. 추구가치성이란 래리 라우든(Laudan, 1977)이 발견/정당화 맥락 구분을 비판하며 제시한 추구/수용 맥락 구분에 바탕을 둔 개념으로, 무엇을 참으로 간주할지보다는 무엇에 자원을 투자해야 할지를 묻는다. 본 발표에서는 추구가치성에 관한 논의를 각각 ‘미래에 수용될 법한 후보의 발전’에 초점을 둔 갈래와 ‘효율적인 학습을 위한 자원 할당’에 초점을 둔 갈래로 구분할 것을 제안한다. 이 두 갈래는 수용의 논리와는 구분되는 다른 종류의 합리성을 탐구한다는 점에서 공통된 방향성을 지니지만, 추구가치성의 주요 평가 대상이나 기준, 정당화 이유 등에서는 뚜렷한 차이를 보인다. 이러한 두 갈래의 구분은 추구가치성 개념에 대한 이해를 더욱 정교화하는 데 이바지할 것이며, 특히 두 번째 갈래의 분리는 C.S. 퍼스의 사상을 보다 체계적으로 탐구할 수 있는 발판을 마련할 것이다.

이병덕
발표 제목: A Kantian Approach to the Problem of Many Hands
초록: When harm results from the collective actions of many individuals, it is often difficult to determine who, if anyone, ought to be held morally responsible. This ethical difficulty is commonly known as the Problem of Many Hands. The aim of this paper is to propose a novel solution to this problem from the perspective of Kantian ethics. To that end, I begin by identifying three key conditions that any adequate account must satisfy in order to resolve the problem. I then argue that the Kantian framework I develop fulfills these conditions. On this basis, I conclude that my Kantian approach offers a compelling and theoretically robust solution to the Problem of Many Hands.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 우인진 / jaegoi53@gmail.com

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제22회 논문발표회를 1월 3일(금요일) 오후 2:35~5:55에 퇴계인문관 31604호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 총 세 분의 선생님을 모시고 아래와 같이 발표를 진행하고자 합니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다. 

일 시: 2025년 1월 3일 금요일 오후 2:35~5:55
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 6층 604호(#31604)

일 정:
2:35~2:40 등록 및 개회 인사
2:40~3:35 김상수 (육군사관학교)
                    Beyond the Problem of Many Hands: Refining Collective Responsibility Attribution through the Distinction of Participatory Intentions
3:40~4:55 이병덕(성균관대) 

                    Can Artificial Intelligence Be a Member of the Moral Community?

            논평: 박성수(성균관대)

5:00~5:55 이찬우 (성균관대/서울대/중앙대)
                   라카토슈주의자가 자세에 맞서는 법

김상수
발표 제목: Beyond the Problem of Many Hands: Refining Collective Responsibility Attribution through the Distinction of Participatory Intentions
초록: The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework for addressing the attribution of responsibility for wrongdoing within large-scale organizations—a challenge commonly known as the “Problem of Many Hands.” This problem arises in complex systems where it proves difficult to determine who should bear how much responsibility when wrongdoing occurs. Overcoming this challenge requires moving beyond a simple individual-level analysis and instead making careful distinctions regarding the nature of each member’s role and intentions within the organization. To achieve this, the paper first provides an overview of existing approaches to attributing collective responsibility, thereby illustrating the need for more refined criteria when distributing responsibility among collective members. It then proposes distinguishing between two types of participatory intentions—“Functional Participatory Intention” and “Immediate Participatory Intention.” By drawing this distinction, it becomes clearer who merely performs assigned functions within the organization and who actively and collectively pursues wrongful aims as a fully complicit agent. In doing so, the paper aims to offer a more justified and refined framework for the attribution of collective responsibility.

이병덕
발표 제목: Can Artificial Intelligence Be a Member of the Moral Community?
초록: According to Kant, all rational beings are members of the moral community. If future artificial intelligence achieves or surpasses human-level intelligence, should it be considered a member of the moral community? The goal of this paper is to defend a negative answer to this question. To this end, it argues for three points. First, for AI to be a member of the moral community, it must be a rational being with good will. But AI fails to satisfy this condition. Second, for AI to be a member of the moral community, its choices and actions must be regulated by moral norms, and effective social sanctions must be possible to enforce these norms on AI. However, since AI lacks genuine self-interest, its choices or actions cannot be effectively regulated through negative social sanctions that restrict or harm its self-interest. Third, Sparrow proposes the so-called ‘Turing Triage Test’ to assess whether AI holds the same moral status as humans. But there are strong reasons to deny that AI would pass the Turing Triage Test.

이찬우
발표 제목: 라카토슈주의자가 자세에 맞서는 법
초록: 경험론, 유물론 같은 것을 두고 우린 '철학적 입장'이라고 부른다. 이런 철학적 입장이란 참이나 거짓이 될 수 있는 명제인가, 아니면 참거짓을 매길 수 없는 일종의 취향 내지는 태도인가? 바스 반 프라센(Bas Van Fraassen)을 위시한 여러 과학철학자들은 후자에 해당하는 견해, 즉 철학적 입장을 자세(stance)로 보는 견해를 피력하며 근래에 유력한 논증을 제시한 바 있다. 본 발표에서는 이러한 견해 및 논증을 비판적으로 검토한 뒤, 이에 맞서 일찌기 임레 라카토슈(Imre Lakatos)가 제시했던 여러 통찰에 바탕을 둔 한 가지 대안을 제시하겠다. 따라서, 철학적 입장이란 곧 참거짓을 매길 수 없는 자세라고 단정하는 것은 섣부른 판단이라고 본 발표에서는 논하겠다.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

발표자 소개 웹주소

김상수: https://www.kma.ac.kr:461/kma/2194/subview.do?enc=Zm5jdDF8QEB8JTJGcHJvZmwlMkZrbWElMkYxJTJGMzQ5JTJGYXJ0Y2xWaWV3LmRvJTNGcGFnZSUzRDElMjZzcmNoQ29sdW1uJTNEJTI2c3JjaFdyZCUzRCUyNg%3D%3D

이찬우: https://chanwoo-lee-phil.github.io/

이병덕: https://skb.skku.edu/philosophy/people/faculty.do?mode=view&perId=LZStrOwEwbAQg7gCgggBhAJQBoFcBMAbARgRgEsAzAZzgBU4BeaoA%20&

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 인유림 / in.yr0805@gmail.com

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제21회 논문발표회를 7월 5일(금요일) 오후 2:40~6:00에 퇴계인문관 31609호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 미국에서 박사과정을 하고 있는 염인철, 정대휘, 두 분의 동문과, 한국외국어대학교의 이승일 선생님 이렇게 총 세 분을 모시고 아래와 같이 발표를 진행하고자 합니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다. 

일 시: 2024년 7월 5일 금요일 오후 2:40~6:00
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 6층 609호(#31609)

일 정:
2:40~2:50 등록 및 개회 인사
2:50~3:40 염인철 (Ohio State University/박사과정)
                   Open Texture and Fictional Indeterminacy
3:40~4:30 정대휘 (University of California, Santa Barbara/박사과정) 

                   Impossible Worlds and What They Cannot Explain

4:40~6:00 이승일 (한국외국어대학교)
                   양자역학은 형이상학적 미결정성의 사례를 제공하는가?

염인철
발표 제목: Open Texture and Fictional Indeterminacy
초록: This paper argues that the predicate “are identical characters” exhibits open texture. Open texture is a kind of linguistic indeterminacy where no existing linguistic practices or non-linguistic facts determine the applicability of a predicate to certain cases. The paper uses Everett’s puzzle about inconsistent fictional identity to motivate the claim of open texture. I consider potential solutions to the puzzle and argue that none can be justified solely on the basis of current linguistic practices or non-linguistic facts, supporting the open texture diagnosis. I conclude by sketching a Quinean approach to resolving open texture in fictional ontology, suggesting that we should evaluate the theoretical costs of each option and choose the one that minimizes revisions to our web of beliefs.

정대휘
발표 제목: Impossible Worlds and What They Cannot Explain
초록: In recent times, a group of philosophers, often dubbed 'impossible-worldists,' including Yagisawa (1988, 2010), Priest (1997, 2016a, 2016b), Restall (1997), Berto (2010), Jago (2012, 2014), Nolan (2017), and Berto and Jago (2019), have embraced impossible-worldism—a view that accepts impossible worlds into their ontological category. However, this paper presents an argument against impossible-worldism. Specifically, I contend that there is a dilemma for impossible-worldism; impossible-worldists will either presuppose a question to determine which kinds of impossible worlds they accept, or they will neglect certain specific cases of problems they claim to solve. But in both horns, the motivation for impossible worldism will be diminished.

이승일
발표 제목: 양자역학은 형이상학적 미결정성의 사례를 제공하는가?
초록: 미결정성(indeterminacy)은 우리 주변에서 쉽게 관찰할 수 있는 현상이다. 예를 들어, 책상 모서리에 위치한 탄소 원자가 그 책상의 일부인지 아닌지, 혹은 머리카락의 절반 정도를 잃은 사람이 대머리인지 아닌지는 명확하게 결정할 수 없어 보인다. 러셀과 루이스, 에반스 등의 영향으로, 전통적으로 다수의 철학자들은 모든 미결정성이 의미론적이거나 인식론적인 이유로 발생하며, 세계나 세계의 일부 자체가 미결정성의 근원이 될 수는 없다고 생각해왔다. 즉, '형이상학적' 미결정성은 존재하지 않는다는 것이다. 그러나 최근 몇몇 철학자들은 형이상학적 미결정성을 옹호하며 그에 대한 체계적 분석을 제시하고 있다. 그 중 가장 대표적인 것은 윌슨의 Determinable-based Account이다. 윌슨의 이론에 따르면, 형이상학적 미결정성은 한 대상이 determinable 속성을 지니면서 동시에 그 determinable에 대한 유일한 determinate를 예화하지 않을 때 발생한다. 윌슨을 포함한 이 이론의 옹호자들은 표준 양자역학의 중첩과 얽힘이 윌슨의 이론에 의해 적절하게 분석될 수 있는 중요한 형이상학적 미결정성의 사례를 제공한다고 주장한다. 본 발표는 이들의 주장을 비판적으로 검토한다. 발표자는 표준 양자역학이 형이상학적 미결정성의 사례를 제공한다는 주장을 반박하기 위해 필요한 이론적 비용이 상대적으로 작음을 보임으로써, 표준 양자역학이 형이상학적 미결정성의 사례를 제공한다고 볼 충분한 이유가 없음을 주장할 것이다.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 인유림 / in.yr0805@gmail.com

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 2024년 봄 해외학자 초청강연을 5월 3일(금요일) 오후 4:00~6:00에 퇴계인문관 31406호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 도쿄도립대학교(Tokyo Metropolitan University)의 Youichi Matsusaka 교수님께서 "Further Words on Words: A Naturalistic Approach to the Ontology of Linguistic Entities"라는 제목으로 발표하실 예정입니다. 선생님들과 학생분들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.

발표 제목: Further Words on Words: A Naturalistic Approach to the Ontology of Linguistic Entities
초록: In his much-discussed paper "Words", David Kaplan proposed a naturalistic approach to the ontology of words. While Kaplan's criticism of the shape-theoretic conception of words has been widely accepted, one of his central claims – that differences in sound or shape between tokens of the same word can be "just about as great as you would like" – has faced near-universal rejection from his critics. An exception to this consensus has emerged in the recent work of Una Stojnić. By taking Kaplan's suggestion that words are dynamic, worldly entities seriously, I will attempt to defend Kaplan's contested claim and compare my position to Stojnić's. In doing so, I will emphasize the role of token resemblance in the evolution of words, a factor that has been overlooked in the existing literature on this topic.

Bio: Prof. Youichi Matsusaka was born in Kyoto, Japan. He completed his B.A. at Kyoto University, earned his M.S. at the University of Tokyo, and achieved his Ph.D. at the University of California, Los Angeles.

세부 일정은 다음과 같습니다.

일 시: 2024년 5월 3일 금요일 오후 4:00~6:00
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 4층 406호(#31406)

일 정:
4:00~6:00 Youichi Matsusaka (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
                   Further Words on Words: A Naturalistic Approach to the Ontology of Linguistic Entities

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 인유림 / in.yr0805@gmail.com

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제20회 논문발표회를 2월 2일(금요일) 12:50~18:00에 퇴계인문관 31709호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 김영성, 인유림, 두 분의 대학원생과, 박성수, 남기혁, 이병덕 선생님 이렇게 총 다섯 분을 모시고 아래와 같이 발표를 진행하고자 합니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다. 

일 시: 2024년 2월 2일 금요일 오후 12:50~6:00
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 7층 709호(#31709)

일 정:
12:50~1:00 등록 및 개회 인사
1:00~1:45 김영성 (성균관대 박사수료)
                   합의 이론을 통해 친구와 연인 구분하기
1:45~2:30 인유림 (성균관대 석사수료)
                   How to Achieve Practical Rationality
2:40~3:40 남기혁 (연세대)
                   The Primitivist’s Dialectic
3:50~4:50 박성수 (성균관대/연세대) 

                   Against an Anti-Realist Account of Theft in Virtual Reality: Why Virtual Objects Exist

5:00~6:00 이병덕 (성균관대)
                   A Kantian Critique of Benatar’s Annihilation Account

김영성
발표 제목: 합의 이론을 통해 친구와 연인 구분하기
초록: 본고에서는 '친구와 연인의 구분에 의한 논증'이 제시된다. 이 논증에 의하면, 자발적이고 친밀한 인간관계에 대한 기존의 모든 이론들은 친구관계와 연애관계를 적절히 구분해줄 수 없다는 점에서 문제가 있다. 나의 합의 이론은 그렇지 않다.

인유림
발표 제목: How to Achieve Practical Rationality
초록: This paper deals with how to achieve practical rationality, specially focusing on the discussion surrounding the formulation of a requirement for means-end coherence (“MEC” for short). A significant amount of recent debate has focused on how to formulate this requirement, with two views predominant among philosophers: narrow-scope and wide-scope formulations. However, I argue that neither of them is satisfactory. The narrow-scope formulation is excessively restrictive, failing to accommodate an agent’s rational decision to abandon her end. Meanwhile, the wide-scope formulation is overly permissive, licensing wishful thinking. Consequently, I propose a middle ground by advocating the medium-scope formulation as the preferred rational requirement for MEC. Additionally, I extend my argument to formulate another requirement of practical rationality known as ‘Enkrasia.’ If these arguments prove successful, they convey an important lesson: one cannot achieve practical rationality by dropping one’s belief.

남기혁
발표 제목: The Primitivist’s Dialectic
초록: Many would agree that, in case it is shown that other things are equal, a reductive theory ought to be preferred over a non-reductive, primitivist theory. For example, it is extremely rare for one to reject the reductionist position of a given domain while conceding that the proposed reductive procedure is successful. Typically, the opposition consists in denying that the subject matter can be reduced. This suggests an unspoken rule of the dialectic that, if something can be reduced, then it should be reduced. In a similar light, conventional metaphysical wisdom tells us that primitivist positions should only be accepted as a last resort. In this talk, I argue that these two attitudes reflect some interesting features of the dialectical obligations one takes on by virtue of advocating a primitivist position. This, I argue, is not merely a psychological or sociological explanation of why these attitudes are so widespread, but instead is something that has profound implications for our epistemic evaluation of theories.

박성수
발표 제목: Against an Anti-Realist Account of Theft in Virtual Reality: Why Virtual Objects Exist
초록: This paper delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the existence of virtual objects. According to an influential anti-realist view about virtual objects, virtual objects are mere pretended game objects and therefore do not exist. I disagree with this view since I believe that there is a fundamental difference between make-believe games and virtual realities. This paper aims to clarify what this difference is and present a prima facie good argument for a realist view about virtual objects.

이병덕
발표 제목: A Kantian Critique of Benatar’s Annihilation Account
초록: Benatar argues that our lives are overall bad. But he denies that his pessimist view supports suicide, claiming that death is also bad. He defends the latter claim partly by advocating the annihilation account, which holds that one’s annihilation is an independent bad. In support of this account, he offers two reasons. His primary reason is that the annihilation of an individual thwarts their interest in continued existence. His secondary reason is that if damaging an object of value is bad, then annihilating the object is bad as well. The purpose of this paper is to argue against Benatar’s annihilation account from a Kantian point of view. For this purpose, I argue mainly for three things. First, even if one’s interest in continued existence is thwarted, this in itself does not support Benatar’s claim that one’s annihilation is an independent bad. Second, while there are situations where damaging an object of value is considered bad, the destruction of such an object in itself is not bad. In a similar vein, while there are situations where annihilating someone is considered bad, the annihilation of an individual in itself is not bad. Third, even if one’s annihilation is an independent bad, this does not provide a reason to refrain from suicide.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 인유림 / in.yr0805@gmail.com

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 2023 해외학자 초청강연을 9월 2일(토요일) 16:00~18:00에 퇴계인문관 31609호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 University College Dublin의 Tatjana von Solodkoff 교수님께서 "Appreciating Perfumes"라는 제목으로 발표하실 예정입니다. (발표의 일부로 Von Solodkoff 교수님이 가져오신 향수들을 맡아보실 기회도 있습니다.) 선생님들과 학생분들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.

발표 제목: Appreciating Perfumes
초록: Perfumes have long held a captivating allure, engaging our senses, evoking emotions, and enriching our imagination. Yet, perfume appreciation has rarely been the topic of philosophical investigation. In this talk, I will distinguish the different ways in which we can appreciate perfumes. Drawing inspiration from Kendall Walton's framework of content-oriented and prop-oriented games of make-believe, I will explore the fascinating interplay between our olfactory experiences, narratives, and games of make-believe. Through this exploration, we will uncover ways to engage with and derive enjoyment from perfumes.

Tatjana von Solodkoff 교수님 웹사이트: https://people.ucd.ie/tatjana.vonsolodkoff/about

Bio: Tatjana is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University College Dublin. Before joining UCD, she finished her PhD at the University of Sheffield, UK, held a postdoc position at the University of Barcelona in Spain, and was an assistant professor at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany. Tatjana's main interests are in ontology and metaontology, as well as the philosophy of fiction broadly construed. She is also curious about the desirability of immortality and the value of death.

아울러 해외학자 초청강연 전에 대학원생들의 발표도 있을 예정입니다. 발표는 모두 영어로 진행됩니다. 역시 관심 있는 분들의 많은 참여 부탁드립니다.

전체 일정은 다음과 같습니다.

일 시: 2023년 9월 2일 토요일 오후 1:30~6:00
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 6층 609호(#31609)

일 정:
1:30~1:35 개회 인사
1:35~2:15 인유림 Yoorim In (성균관대 석사과정)
                   Parallelizing Universalism and Nihilism
2:20~3:00 안태규 Taegyu An (중앙대 석사과정)
                   Grounding as an Identity Dependence – A Defense of Grounding from an Essentialist View
3:05~3:45 김정균 Jungkyun Kim (성균관대 박사과정)
                   Defending Contextualism on Singular Existential
4:00~6:00 Tatjana von Solodkoff (University College Dublin)
                   Appreciating Perfumes

인유림 Yoorim In
발표 제목: Parallelizing Universalism and Nihilism
초록: This paper critically reviews permissivism, with a specific focus on universalism. In Section 1, I outline the universalists’ main thesis and two arguments supporting it. In Sections 2 and 3, I argue that none of them are promising. Additionally, I demonstrate that universalists are confronted with a dilemma regarding perceptual beliefs since their principal arguments are founded on premises that rely on perception. In Section 4, I consider a potential strategy to avoid this predicament and assess its effectiveness. Then I conclude that universalists need a different solution that does not depend on perception.

안태규 Taegyu An
발표 제목: Grounding as an Identity Dependence – A Defense of Grounding from an Essentialist View
초록: This paper defends the introduction of Grounding by elucidating its concept and role. Contemporary metaphysicians try to capture the structure of reality with Grounding. Wilson (2014), however, expresses concern about the project due to the incomprehensibility of Grounding. I expect that Grounding essentialism can relieve the worry. Grounding essentialism understands Grounding through essentialist connection. However, not all theories can do the job successfully. The forthcoming discussion will introduce two views: one positing that Grounding entails an essentialist connection, and the other positing that it is synonymous with it. The former is Wallner’s theory, according to which full support for Grounding is challenging. In this regard, I point out its two problems. And as one of the latter views, I propose an approach that amalgamates the theories of Correia&Skiles (2019) and Zylstra (2019). And this approach will show how can relieve Wilson’s concern while evading Wallner’s problems. As a result, this paper indirectly defends the introduction of Grounding.

김정균 Jungkyun Kim
발표 제목: Defending Contextualism on Singular Existential
초록: This paper defends contextualism on singular existential (“contextualism” for short), which contends a singular sentence including an existence predicate can have different semantic content depending on the context of the utterance of it. Those who presented a contextualist approach such as Thomason (1999), von Solodkoff (2014), and Spewak (2016) defended their views by focusing on explaining seemingly true negative existential sentences. In the first part of this paper, I suggest there are further considerations to accept contextualism. In the second part, I consider the two major problems of the previous contextualists' approach. And then, I present my version of contextualism, which can address those problems successfully.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 인유림 / in.yr0805@gmail.com

"철학과인문교육" 연구소 제19회 논문발표회  

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제19회 논문발표회를 6월 30일(금요일)에 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다. 이번 발표회에서는 박성수 선생님께서 "Are Names Variables?"라는 제목으로, 원유나 선생님께서는 “Engineering Silencing”라는 제목으로 발표하실 예정입니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.

박성수 선생님 웹사이트: https://sites.google.com/site/seongsooparkphilosophy/

원유나 선생님 웹사이트: https://sites.google.com/view/yunawon2021/home

- 아래-

일 시: 2023년 6월 30일 금요일 오후 3시 00분~6시 00분

장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 6층 604호(#31604)

주최: 성균관대학교 철학과

주관: 성균관대학교 철학과인문교육 연구소

3:00~3:05 개회 인사

3:05~4:25 박성수

제목: "Are Names Variables?"

4:25~4:40 휴식

4:40~6:00 원유나

제목: “Engineering Silencing”

- 발표논문1 (박성수)

제목: " Are Names Variables?”

초록: Variabilism about proper names is the view that proper names should be semantically interpreted as variables, similar to how pronouns are interpreted. This view conflicts with the orthodox view of proper names, according to which proper names are constants in their semantic contributions. Since the orthodox view aligns better with our intuition, proponents of Variabilism (Cumming, 2008; Ninan, 2012; Schoubye, 2017, 2020) need to present persuasive reasons to justify their view. In fact, they attempt to do so by primarily employing two types of strategies: Theoretical and practical. The aim of this paper is to show that the strategies supporting Variabilism are not compelling.

- 발표논문2 (원유나)

제목: “Engineering Silencing”

초록: Catharine McKinnon famously claimed that pornography silences women as part of her arguments for anti-pornography legislation. Langton and Hornsby provide the very first philosophical defense of the silencing claim using Austin’s speech act theory. Their ingenious approach gave rise to rich debates on the notion of silencing and speech-related harms and injustice. There are two general methodological concerns about Langton and Hornsby’s project. First, their speech act theoretic definition of silencing is immediately challenged by various counterexamples. Sometimes philosophers even have conflicting intuitions about some critical cases. Such an intuition impasse raises methodological concerns. Second, it can be asked whether it is acceptable to defend a controversial claim with significant practical implications by devising a new concept or redefining an existing term, and when such an approach is regarded as successful. I argue that the silencing literature is a collective conceptual engineering project. And, we can address the two issues using this new angle and the recent metaphilosophical debates on conceptual engineering.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu

철학과인문교육연구소 조교 정대휘 / 010-2543-3664 / dh960120@naver.com

"철학과인문교육" 연구소 제18회 논문발표회  

성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제18회 논문발표회를 12월 17일(토요일)에 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.

이번 발표회에서는 박사학위를 받은지 얼마 되지 않으신 신진 학자 선생님들의 발표를 듣는 기회를 갖고자 합니다. 먼저 the University of Southern California에서 학위를 하신 이준효 선생님께서 "'Ought' and Intervals"라는 제목으로, the University of Kansas에서 학위를 하신 최동용 선생님께서는 “The Nature of Achievement: The Comparative Value Approach”이라는 제목으로 발표하실 예정입니다. 대학원 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.

- 아래-

일 시: 2022년 12월 17일 토요일 오후 3시 00분~6시 00분 

장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 4층 409호(#31409)

주최: 성균관대학교 철학과

주관: 성균관대학교 철학과인문교육 연구소

3:00~3:05 개회 인사 

3:05~4:25 이준효 

제목: "Ought" and Intervals

4:25~4:40 휴식

4:40~6:00 최동용 

제목: The Nature of Achievement: The Comparative Value Approach

- 발표논문1 (이준효)

제목: "Ought" and Intervals

초록: Over the last few decades, the semantics of “ought” has proliferated along with an expanding diversity of conceptions of both what and how we communicate with deontic modals. Examples include classical semantics, contrastive semantics, and conflict accounts. However, most of these views do share one striking feature – the idea that “ought” claims are evaluated on an ordinal scale. I argue in this paper that this assumption is mistaken. By considering some new data that haven’t been considered before, I show why deontic “ought” claims require at least an interval scale, and why this creates an adequacy problem for a wide range of existing views. I will also show, by considering two other proposals, that simply incorporating particular interval scales into our semantics does not suffice. I will argue that we need the difference between values, not just values on an interval scale. In closing, I will show how my account of “ought”-claims can be extended to capture the unity of epistemic and deontic “ought”-claims. 

- 발표논문2 (최동용)

제목: The Nature of Achievement: The Comparative Value Approach

초록: While investigating the value of achievements, Dunkle claims that lucky achievements are possible. For instance, if a person does great works, then it is possible that the works have the status of achievements, even if luck plays a crucial role in doing the great works. Rather than examining Dunkle’s claim, this paper proceeds discussion under the assumption that lucky achievements are possible. In particular, based on this assumption, this paper suggests a new approach to the nature of achievement named the Comparative Value Approach. According to the comparative value approach, a product can have the status of an achievement if the product is valuable in an achievement-relevant domain, and in that domain the product is valuable more than most other items which either have been achieved or can be achieved by others. This paper shows that the comparative value approach successfully explains the cases of achievements, including the cases of lucky achievements. Besides this reason, this paper provides three more reasons to support the comparative value approach. The approach can accommodate the fact that there are various kinds of achievements, such as artistic and historical achievements; the approach can explain the relation between the nature of achievement and the achievement-value of a product; and the approach can show why in determining the status of a product it matters that for average people achieving a similar kind of product is sufficiently difficult. Based on these four reasons, this paper concludes that the comparative value approach is a plausible understanding of achievements.

오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (300원; 교통카드 사용 가능)

궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.

철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu

철학과인문교육연구소 조교 정대휘 / 010-2543-3664 / dh960120@skku.edu