Article

IJCS

International Journal of
Comparative Sociology
2014, Vol. 55(1) 45–72

DOI: 10.1177/0020715214525431
cos.sagepub.com
SAGE

Love thy neighbor: Explaining asylum seeking and hosting, 1982–2008

Eunhye Yoo
Soongsil University, Korea

Jeong-Woo Koo
Sungkyunkwan University, Korea

Abstract

Using a Tobit analysis, this article examines factors influencing asylum seekers' filing of asylum applications and host countries' recognition of convention refugees. From the views that stress socio-politico-economic conditions, we find that welfare-provisional and geographically close countries often become targets of asylum seekers, whereas politically secured and geographically remote countries have higher propensity to recognize legal status of asylum seekers. From a world polity perspective, we note that asylum seekers prefer the countries that have national refugee legislation, ratify more human rights treaties, and have greater international nongovernmental organizations membership, yet host countries – despite their linkage to the world polity – abstain from granting legal protection to asylum seekers, suggesting the possibility of a decoupling. This study contributes to both a more systematic understanding of global refugee movements and the ongoing debate on whether individuals and countries act strategically or are influenced by world cultural principles.

Keywords

Asylum seeker, immigration policy, refugee, Tobit model, world polity

Introduction

As internal civil conflicts continue to intensify worldwide, asylum seekers gained considerable attention in world politics. Major European countries long sought to tighten the border; consequently, the asylum flow shifted to many developing countries. Now more than 100 countries maintain procedures to recognize asylum seekers' legal status in conjunction with the refugee conventions and indeed accepted them in their soil. The salience of refugees in general and asylum seekers in particular speak to the core of contemporary globalization because the issue involves a

Corresponding author:
Jeong-Woo Koo, Department of Sociology, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul 110-745, Korea.
Email: jkoo@skku.edu

tremendous level of movements of individuals with different nationalities across borders. Despite the heightened salience of the asylum field, sociologists rarely study the underlying mechanism of asylum flows. They have little knowledge of what accounts for the increasingly diversified exploration of asylum seekers and varied policy responses of the receiving countries (Joly et al., 1992; Ramakers, 1997).

Nonetheless, several studies in social science examined asylum flows and asked why certain countries attract asylum seekers more than others and what the policy responses from such preferred countries are (Castles et al., 2003; Hatton, 2009; Hix and Noury, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2006, 2007; Neumayer, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). Such studies which are mostly in the rationalist line of research devoted attention to *dyadic* characteristics between the origin and destination countries, that is, either the factors associated with socio-politico-economic situations in origin countries and/or the factors with those in destination countries (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997). In doing so, scholars failed to address the influence of the global institutional environment in which the dyadic linkage between the sending and receiving countries is embedded. As world polity scholars suggest, this worldwide institutional process socializes destination countries as members of the world society, pressures them to hold responsibilities as a legitimate nation-state, and encourages them to respect the rights of asylum seekers (Boli and Thomas, 1997; Bromley et al., 2011; Koo and Ramirez, 2009).

We assume that the global institutional process progressively influences both asylum seekers and destination countries: as individuals with intentions, asylum seekers are likely to be aware of world cultural values (e.g. rights, justice, responsibility, accountability, etc.) and therefore make their choices accordingly, whereas potential destination countries also come under pressure to make choices in ways that align themselves with global norms and standards (Soysal, 2012). With this assumption, we seek to broaden the spectrum of the study of the global asylum outflows as well as the subsequent policy responses.

To conduct our research, we focus on the two closely intertwined episodes of the global refugee movement, that is, asylum lodging and asylum recognition. The former refers to asylum applications which applicants who entered spontaneously from their country of origin lodge, whereas the latter is the proportions of asylum applications which result in recognition under the refugee conventions. We then analyze which immediate socio-politico-economic processes and global institutional processes account for these interconnected episodes. We choose to examine asylum lodging and recognition for two important reasons: first, several pioneering studies addressing asylum lodging left the subsequent process of policy response unexplored (Moore and Shellman, 2007; Neumayer, 2004, 2005b); second, we assume that there exists an intrinsic connection between asylum lodging and recognition – especially, tougher decisions deterring applications.

Because we focus only on asylum seekers, rather than refugees in general, this article concerns only those persons who officially filed a formal request for asylum. We do not include other refugees who are either unwilling or unable to lodge an application in our analysis. In fact, much of the existing studies focus on the stock of refugees rather than the flow of asylum seekers (Hatton, 2009). Our assumption is that compared with refugees in general, asylum seekers are more conscious about where to go and have more motivation to seek information that would allow them to relocate more successfully (Castles et al., 2003). Consequently, we expect a more elaborate policy response from receiving governments toward asylum seekers, which permits us to conduct a systematic study of this response.

We use a pooled time-series and cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset covering the period between 1982 and 2008, and employ a Tobit-regression technique, which is an appropriate model commonly used to deal with censored dependent variables. Consistent with past cross-national studies employing world polity theory, we deal with *monadic* panel data suitable for analyzing the characteristics

of destination countries and their ties to the world polity. Since we use monadic data, rather than dyadic data, we are unable to disaggregate by country of origin or address differences in the sending country characteristics. Because we focus on asylum applications and recognition rates in all potential destination countries for over two decades, data broken down by origin and destination countries are not available for all the countries over the course of the entire observation period.[1]

Our study improves on the past studies regarding global asylum flows in several important ways: first, we cover one of the longest observation periods, including the most recent decade (27 years up to 2008); second, we use a global sample that is not confined to developed countries (unlike Neumayer, 2004 and Hatton, 2009); third, we treat asylum application and asylum recognition, simultaneously, in ways that allow for a direct comparison of their statistical analyses. The first and foremost improvement of the study, however, is to consider a global institutional account of asylum inflows and the corresponding policy responses.

We find general support for the previous studies which stress the effects of socio-politico-economic conditions of the potential host countries; yet, we also note the relevancy of several factors that capture the effects of the world polity and the international refugee regime. Notwithstanding the salience of such global institutional pressures, our analysis reveals that countries' adoption of national law relating to refugees, as well as their linkage to international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), might be largely decoupled from actual implementation involving countries' recognition of legal status of asylum seekers. These findings bring the refugee literature one step closer to the terrain of sociological investigation, and also allow for a more systematic understanding of the dynamics of asylum flows.

Historical background of refugee movements

With the continuous outflow of refugees after World War II, the international community began to design an international regime for the protection of refugees' fundamental rights. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) came to existence in 1950 and the organization began to play a pivotal role in coordinating a broad range of activities for the protection of refugees. Then, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, which took effect on 1 January 1951. However, the temporal and geographical limitations of the historic 1951 convention led the UN to draft the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which redefined refugees by broadening the previously Euro-centric scope.

Despite the consolidation of the international refugee regime, the world witnessed an escalating trend of refugee outflows, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. The dissolution of the Soviet Union further added to the number of refugees and other people of concern, and significant global occurrences, such as the massive exodus of people from Iraqi Kurdistan and the Balkans as well as the Rwanda and Afghan refugee crises, further contributed to the refugee population. The estimated number of refugees increased from over 10.3 million in 1982 to over 16.3 million in 1993 along with 36 million people of concern to the UNHCR in 2009 (UNHCR; UNHCR, 2010a).[2]

Spurred by the accelerating number of refugees worldwide, as well as their increasing awareness of the ready support from international protection agencies, the number of refugees who *seek* asylum grew dramatically. This specified group of refugees, 'asylum seekers', consists of individuals who have applied for asylum or refugee status but have not yet received a final decision (UNHCR, 2010b). Only a small fraction of asylum seekers receives legal protection from host countries; the majority with rejected claims must leave the country either voluntarily or forcibly – with or without official assistance. There is also evidence that a large proportion of failed asylum seekers decide to stay illegally (Field and Edwards, 2006).



Figure 1. The number of asylum applications in the world: 1982–2008.

Figure 1 details the historical changes in the number of individuals who seek to gain residence in another country from 1982 to 2008. The number remained lower than 500,000 until 1988, but skyrocketed and reached its apex in 1993. The number dropped substantially in the mid-1990s and most notably in the mid-2000s; however, it began to creep upwards again in the years of 2007 and 2008, as 993,581 refugees lodged their applications with over 100 countries in 2008.[3]

Table 1 shows a list of the top and bottom 5 to 10 states among the countries that received asylum applications for three points in time: 1982, the starting year of the study, 1996, when the countries of asylum grew substantially in number (63), and 2008, the ending year of the observation period. The table shows that Western countries received most applications in the 1980s and that the 10 countries with the highest number of asylum applications in 1996 were mostly Western countries, except for South Africa. Asylum seekers submitted tens of thousands of refugee applications in traditionally lenient countries, such as the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia, and France. Except for Ecuador and South Africa, the top recipient countries in 2008 were also Western countries, yet their average number of asylum applications filed decreased substantially from 40,411 to 20,129 during this period. Conversely, the bottom 10 countries (excluding countries with no asylum applications) at both points in time include several South American, African, and Asian countries, but their average shares of asylum applications increased dramatically.

Facing this trend, countries sought to restrict refugees' access to their territories as well as welfare benefits and working rights, thereby suppressing the number of asylum seekers (Schuster, 2000). Research suggests that the decline in applications in the early and mid-2000s is due to such measures (Hatton, 2009). In particular, European countries underwent criticism that their asylum policies moved away from humanitarian considerations to state interests (Kjaerum, 2002). The

Table 1. Top and bottom 10 countries of submitted asylum applications, 1982–2008.*

Top 5 in 1982		Bottom 5 in 1982	
United States	33,296	Finland	12
France	22,505	Norway	100
Sweden	10,225	Denmark	298
Switzerland	7,135	Japan	530
Austria	6,314	Portugal	1,115
Top 10 in 1996		**Bottom 10 in 1996**	
United States	571,251	Nicaragua	1
Germany	197,926	Bolivia	3
United Kingdom	106,650	Chile	5
Canada	52,439	Iceland	7
Switzerland	36,213	Ecuador	8
Netherlands	35,751	Croatia	11
Australia	25,447	Colombia	26
France	17,405	Cote d'Ivoire	29
South Africa	15,986	Albania	30
Belgium	12,433	Philippines	54
Top 10 in 2008		**Bottom 10 in 2008**	
South Africa	207,206	Gambia	4
Canada	72,314	Belize	9
Germany	62,081	Papua New Guinea	11
United States	52,657	El Salvador	12
Sweden	47,386	Timor-Leste	16
Austria	46,727	Guatemala	16
Ecuador	45,020	Estonia	20
France	43,652	Paraguay	29
United Kingdom	37,345	Albania	35
Italy	30,324	Niger	40

so-called burden-sharing became a popular axiom in Europe (Thielemann, 2004). Consequently, developing countries faced an increasing burden of providing protection for asylum seekers (Hein, 1993; Roberts, 1998).

Nonetheless, countries indeed hosted a significant number of refugees, and granted legal status to asylum seekers. In fact, countries' endorsement of the international norms of refugee protection and the corresponding national incorporation paved the way for such policy responses. Since the 1950s, a total of 147 countries have become parties to one or both of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol as of 1 April 2011 (UNHCR, 2011a). In addition, countries sought to pass national refugee laws or, less frequently, to amend their constitutions in order to conform to international standards.[4]

Notwithstanding the countries' efforts to incorporate global norms into their national jurisdiction, the proportion of decisions that yields recognition under the 1951 Convention, that is, recognition rate, remains stagnant (shown in Table 2). Other than the early 1980s, the rate has always been below 10 percent, indicating that less than 1 in 10 asylum seekers acquired legal status. Only a small proportion of recognized asylum seekers subsequently obtain their rights to work, rights to social welfare, and other basic rights, whereas most of the rejected asylum seekers are legally compelled to leave the country either voluntarily or forcibly. In fact, a large segment of failed asylum

Table 2. Recognition rates of asylum seeker, 1982–2008.

	1982	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2008
No. of applications	145,679	389,096	798,156	110,5356	1,233,963	1,080,279	993,581
No. of recognized	54,029	41,060	46,594	72,606	102,531	59,720	97,772
Recognition rate	37.09	10.55	5.84	6.57	8.31	5.53	9.84
No. of countries	18	19	23	30	92	100	102

Table 3. Top and bottom 10 countries recognizing asylum seekers, 1982–2008.

Top 10 in 1982		Bottom 10 in 1982	
Austria	99.23	Netherlands	6.34
France	69.63	Finland	8.33
Sweden	60.52	Switzerland	9.18
Greece	52.26	Spain	9.39
United Kingdom	40.9	Canada	11.64
Top 10 in 1996		**Bottom 10 in 1996**	
Costa Rica	100	Japan	0.03
Ghana	95.63	Norway	0.34
El Salvador	95.33	Luxembourg	0.59
Benin	89.03	Portugal	1.19
Malta	75.89	Finland	1.55
Malawi	64.41	Russia	1.61
Nigeria	62.96	Sweden	2.22
Uganda	51.89	United States	2.37
Zimbabwe	43.6	Spain	2.5
Guatemala	40.32	Ireland	3.05
Top 10 in 2008		**Bottom 10 in 2008**	
Botswana	80.41	Israel	0.02
Ethiopia	70.85	Greece	0.05
Tajikistan	54.91	Ecuador	0.08
Uganda	39.34	Senegal	0.11
Burundi	29.28	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.14
Mexico	27.6	Gabon	0.18
New Zealand	26.92	Republic of Congo	0.37
Costa Rica	26.20	Azerbaijan	0.39
Australia	24.38	Guinea	0.39
France	22.1	Cyprus	0.47

The numbers refer to percentage.

seekers decide to stay illegally with an expectation that their life might be better off in such countries than in their origin countries (Hatton, 2009).

Table 3 presents a list of recognition rates for the top and bottom five to 10 asylum-receiving countries in 1982, 1996, and 2008. Despite Western dominance in 1982, several developing (e.g. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Ghana) or less-developed countries (Botswana, Ethiopia, and Uganda) from Latin America and Africa are ranked at the top in 1996 and 2008, whereas Western or affluent countries (e.g. Japan, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United States) comprised the bottom

10 countries in 1996. Interestingly, though some of the listed Western countries escaped the bottom 10 in 2008, their average recognition rates slipped from 10.6 in 1996 to 8.6 in 2008. Research suggests that tougher decisions taken from the 1990s began to have a real impact in such a way that the majority of Western countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, etc.) substantially lowered their recognition rates (Hatton, 2009).

Theories and hypotheses

Past studies, first and foremost, emphasize political and economic conditions of host countries as the major determinants of an asylum seeker's choice and a receiving country's response (Borjas, 1989; Jacobsen, 1994, 1996; Scheinman, 1983). This idea often reflects a rationalist understanding that asylum seekers and host countries have certain intentions, goals, and choices and also seek to maximize benefits, and minimize costs (Basok, 1990; Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004). Asylum seekers might minimize costs and maximize benefits when they successfully relocate to safe and affluent countries, which value their lives and provide for their economic needs (Moore and Shellman, 2004). Countries also make similar choices when they are confident with their political and economic capacity to properly absorb refugees (Delouvin, 2000).

By focusing on the political conditions of a receiving country, this view posits that asylum seekers might seek new residences where their physical security as well as their liberty and freedom – the ones which were most seriously challenged at home – are more likely to be guaranteed. This motivation often led refugees to seek asylum in Western countries, which are perceived as nations most likely to grant/provide such conditions. In general, we hypothesize that asylum seekers are more likely to file for asylum applications in countries which maintain national security, promote democracy, and respect human rights.

Scholars, in particular, view economic conditions as instrumental (Bocker and Havinga, 1998). They consider refugees' motivations to flee their homes, which are associated with poverty, as the root cause of refugee outflows (Khan, 1981; Wood, 1994; Zolberg et al., 1989). The same motivation is easily applicable to the motivations underlying an asylum seeker's choice of destination. With the belief that potential destinations bring them more economic opportunities and reasonable welfare provisions, refugees are more likely to lodge their applications to relocate to economically robust countries. The idea that political and economic conditions of host countries largely shape the choices of asylum seekers motivates the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The number of asylum applications is higher in safe and affluent countries, which are
(1a) more politically secured,
(1b) more democratic,
(1c) more human rights respective,
(1d) economically affluent, and
(1e) more welfare oriented.

In a similar vein, policy responses of potential host countries would also be a function of their own political and economic conditions. If the geopolitical environment is relatively peaceful, and thus security concerns are low, a country might be less likely to view refugees as potential threats. When countries are more committed to human rights and democratic values, they are more likely to view the issue of refugees at a humanitarian angle. These countries have relatively more open and justice-sensitive citizens, with fewer propensities for xenophobic and anti-immigrant feelings

(Gordenker, 1987). Added to this are concerns with external image, such as France's well-known claim to be the birthplace of human rights and Sweden's touted role as the moral conscience of the world (Schuster, 2000).

The economic capacity of host countries is also consequential. Apparently, economically robust countries are more capable of dealing with strains on economic resources and better able to afford the required expenses involving refugee inflows (Jacobsen, 1996). Several scholars associate negative policy responses from potential host countries with periods of economic downturn. With high economic capacity, the potential costs for host countries would decrease. For example, local workers and people in affluent economies would be less likely to be concerned when refugees arrive with their agricultural skills, labor, and capital (Jacobsen, 1996).

Perhaps, it is also true that economically affluent countries, as rational actors, might respond to the influx of refugees by tightening their borders, substituting permanent asylum with temporary protection, and also sharing the burden with their allies (Boswell, 2003; Noll, 2003). In the 1990s, when an exodus of people from the Soviet Union occurred, traditionally lenient countries demonstrated orchestrated efforts to tighten their borders. Yet, the economic downturn in Western Europe in the 1980s largely promoted the enforcement of such restrictive measures, ironically further strengthening the argument emphasizing economic conditions. Such a rationalist conjecture leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Asylum recognition rates are higher in countries with political and economic capacity, which are
(2a) more politically secured,
(2b) more democratic,
(2c) more human rights respective,
(2d) economically affluent, and
(2e) more welfare oriented.

Inspired by the literature on the general international migrants, several scholars examined the role of social networks characterized by ethnicity, kinship, family ties, and smugglers in influencing the asylum cycle, including the choice of destinations by migrants (Koser, 1997; Neumayer, 2004, 2005b), and in shaping the responses of a host country (Waldron and Hasci, 1995). Here, the focus is to examine whether social ties that are known to influence international migration also determine asylum flows, because asylum seekers are often characterized as labor migrants in disguise (Kim and Cohen, 2010). Interestingly, the social network perspective has an affinity with the rationalist view, because this view treats refugees and host countries as key decision makers who come to decisions about the utility of networks at their disposal. Yet, social networks would also operate in a way of restricting significantly rational, independent choices. The influence of smugglers and their established migration routes provide the case in point.

More concretely, asylum seekers consider the existence of social ties when they consider where to go, as well as decide whether to leave. This consideration might be primarily associated with cost-reduction mechanisms rooted in networks – economic assistance, employment advice, and emotional support. In the case that smugglers play an instrumental role in influencing the choices of asylum seekers, however, social networks might work in such a way as to suppress their choices, because the well-established routes by the smugglers largely determine the destinations. At any event, social networks indeed matter in affecting the choices of asylum seekers.

Hypothesis 3: The number of asylum applications is higher in countries that provide higher levels of networks at the asylum seekers' disposal.

Research also portrays that countries with various network ties tend to receive a higher number of asylum requests, and have higher rates of acceptance (Gurak and Caces, 1992; Hugo, 1981). Africans going to Portugal, France, and the United Kingdom; Asians heading to France; and Latin Americans going to Spain are examples of the refugee movement that occurs alongside ethnic and cultural networks. In a study of determinants of migration policies in the European Union (EU), Hix and Noury (2007) maintain that favorable voting in the European Parliament toward immigration was a function of cultural preferences of each country's constituents and use the measure of the proportion of foreign-born population in each EU member country. It might also be true, however, that when an influx of asylum claims overwhelms the countries with various social ties, these countries might respond to tighten their borders. Consider that the *over-representation* of asylum seekers from former colonies also motivated the burden-sharing project. Despite the possibilities of the negative association, we maintain that, in general, the existence of social networks in a host country would lower the costs associated with welcoming asylum seekers in their territories; the level of social receptiveness would be high, and the likelihood that accepting refugees will impede social, ethnic harmony would be low. These predictions motivate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Asylum recognition rates are higher in countries that maintain a higher degree of foreign ethnic networks.

Scholars routinely link geographical proximity to what motivates the migration of asylum seekers. Because of the obvious constraints on resources and information, numerous refugees flee to the nearest countries in order to avoid the immediate threat of persecution at home and seek asylum there. Since the early 1980s, the largest number of refugees in the world has come from Afghanistan; most Afghan refugees reside either in Pakistan or in Iran, the two nearest countries. Germany also serves a case in point: a key explanation for Germany's disproportionate share of the total volume of asylum applications received involves the accessibility of the country across land from Central and Eastern Europe (Bocker and Havinga, 1998). The enforcement of the Dublin Convention signed in 1990 and which came into force in the EU in 1997 further strengthens the geographical explanation; according to the convention, the responsible member state will be the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU.

Hypothesis 5: The number of asylum applications is higher in countries that are closest to their homes than those that are further away from their homes.

For countries, however, a natural reaction to the influx of refugees and the subsequently increasing number of asylum requests might lead them to tighten their borders. In fact, scholars argue that the Dublin Convention places excessive pressure on border areas, where countries are often least capable of providing asylum seekers with support and protection. For example, Greece recently received much media attention because the country took further restrictive asylum policies, resulting in lowered recognition rates and the corresponding mobilization of protests by the refugees.

Hypothesis 6: Asylum recognition rates are lower in countries that are geographically close to refugee-generating countries than those further removed from refugee-producing countries.

Research also suggests that low recognition rates or tougher decisions play a role in deterring asylum lodging (Robinson and Segrott, 2002). Spurred by a surge of asylum applications which occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, European governments sought to tighten access to the

country's territory by rigidifying procedures that determine refugee status, and making asylum applicants' living conditions less palatable. Stricter policy measures coupled with lower recognition rates often work together in dampening the asylum influx (Holzer et al., 2000; Thielemann, 2004; Vogler and Rotte, 2000). Hatton (2009), for example, attributes the reverse of the rising tide of asylum applications in the mid-2000s to sharp policy backlash European governments took, including lowering the recognition rates. Therefore, it is evident that asylum application flows change in response to the different recognition rates.[5]

Hypothesis 7: Asylum recognition rates positively affect the number of asylum applications.

In contrast with various explanations in past studies that stress – internal – political, economic, and cultural conditions of host countries, world polity institutionalism focuses on the external institutional conditions linked to supranational norms and institutions. In this line of thought, often being egoistic and deliberate as the rationalist view maintains, world cultural formulations with a highly standardized style script, construct, and legitimate individuals and nation-states in modern society (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000).

World polity theorists posit that the so-called carriers of wider cultural principles play a pivotal role in formulating and disseminating world cultural principles, and the carriers include scientists, professionals, and their organizations and associations (Meyer, 2010). For example, human rights–promoting professions, their organizations, and conferences influence sovereign states to ratify human rights treaties, adopt human rights institutions, and add human rights education to the academic curricula (Cole, 2005; Koo and Ramirez, 2009; Moon and Koo, 2011).

In the area of refugees, such carriers of global cultural principles constitute the international refugee regime by drafting refugee conventions, pressuring countries to endorse the documents, and authorizing activities of INGOs. Considering that the UNHCR distributed 27 percent of its total expenditure through 647 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and/or INGOs, and entered into 1270 agreements with them (UNHCR, 2010b) suggests the centrality of refugee-related organizations.[6] UNHCR and its local branches often provide refugee and asylum seekers with information on asylum law and processes, and local NGOs and/or specialized agencies linked to UNHCR provide legal advising for asylum seekers. In doing so, these global moral entrepreneurs play an instrumental role in disseminating the global norms and standards relating to the rights of refugees/asylum seekers, as well as providing vital information on where they go, and how they travel (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Jacobsen, 1996).

Consequently, the world polity institutionalist view maintains that asylum seekers are more likely to lodge their applications to a country with a closer linkage to the world polity, particularly the international refugee regime. The strength of a country's linkage to the central polity might be an indication of the extent to which the country weakens its exclusively nationalistic treatment of its citizens and welcomes newcomers. Given that recipient countries are no longer limited to their neighboring ones, asylum seekers, including the new generation of 'jet age' refugees (Dowty and Loescher, 1996: 50), increasingly enjoy an expanded list of potential host countries, including those who are closely aligned with international norms and standards.[7] It is especially true when considering potential host countries which are nonbordering or farther away from the country of origin (Moore and Shellman, 2007).

Hypothesis 8: The number of asylum applications is higher in countries with stronger links to the world polity, especially the international refugee regime, than those with weaker links to the world polity.

Research suggests that the degree of a country's links to the world polity indeed matters: the more active countries are in the global governance structure, the more likely countries are to modify their sovereign principles and to adopt policies which global norms promote (Suárez et al., 2009). Globally active countries with high profiles on human rights treaty ratifications, rights-organization participation, and rights-conference attendance might compromise their preferred policy directions and accommodate the recommendations from global moral entrepreneurs (Gordenker, 1976).

Hypothesis 9: Asylum recognition rates are higher in countries with stronger links to the world polity, including the international refugee regime, than those with weaker links to the world polity.

Data and methods

To test our hypotheses, we use a dataset comprising of cross-sectional time-series data from 1982 to 2008, and employ a random-effects Tobit model. Because we assigned 0 values to the unobserved cases of the dependent variables, our final sample is a combination of observations with 0 and positive values of the refugee recognition rate and refugee application. We considered 89 countries for both dependent variables.[8] Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analyses.

Dependent variable

Two dependent variables are used in the analysis: (1) the number of asylum applications submitted (logged), and (2) countries' refugee recognition rates. These variables are collected from the UNHCR statistical yearbooks (UNHCR, various years). The number of asylum applications includes pending cases for the focal year; we calculate the refugee recognition rate from the total number of people given convention refugee status divided by the total number of applications for a given year. In practice, the refugee status determination (RSD) process includes government activities, such as recruited adjudicators dealing with filed asylum applications and documenting conditions of refugees. When states have no effective asylum system, UNHCR steps in and takes over individual RSD (Stainsby, 2009: 52). The average processing time varies according to individual circumstances and the government administrative system. For example, in 2002, the average length of an individual RSD in Kenya was 2 hours (Albert, 2010: 11), whereas the United Kingdom had an average processing time for an initial decision of 13 months (Gibney, 2008: 159). Given the increasing number of applications filed during the 1980s and 1990s, most of the receiving countries streamlined processing and created rapid asylum procedures (Martin and Schoenholtz, 1999). However, the average processing time worldwide is 1 year to 18 months (US Department of State, 2013).

Independent variables

Political security index. Based on the factor analysis, we construct a political security index using three interrelated variables: political violence in neighboring states, level of democracy, and level of human rights protection. The three measures are transformed into standardized variables with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Norusis, 2005).[9] Detailed descriptions are as follows:

Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Sources
Dependent variables					
Number of asylum applications	3.179	3.916	0	12.293	UNHCR (various years)
Total recognition rates	6.420	14.709	0	100	UNHCR (various years)
Independent variables					
Political/economic conditions					
Political security index	0.314	0.941	−2.406	1.563	Marshall et al. (2010a) and Amnesty International (various years)
GDP per capita (logged)	16.086	1.382	12.796	20.841	World Bank (2008)
Welfare regime(% of revenue)	16.795	14.806	0	49.372	World Bank (2008)
Networks and geographic proximity					
Remittances (current US$, logged)	17.604	2.572	7.25	24.72	World Bank (2008)
Common language shared	1.669	1.619	0	6	Melitz and Toubal (2012)
Total number of neighboring countries	6.212	3.312	0	22	Stinnett et al. (2002)
Neighbors of top 10 sending countries	0.183	0.387	0	1	Correlates of War Project
Deterrence and influx					
Total recognition rate ($t-1$)	6.281	14.783	0	100	UNHCR (various years)
World polity linkages					
1967 Protocol adoption	0.814	0.389	0	1	UNHCR (2011a)
Domestic Refugee Law	0.456	0.498	0	1	US Department of State (various years) and US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI, (various years)
Int'l HR Conventions	5.762	2.161	0	9	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2009)
INGOs (logged)	6.692	0.896	0	8.335	Union of International Associations (UIA) (various years)
Controls					
Refugee inflows (logged)	7.868	3.100	0	14.223	UNHCR (various years)
Population (logged)	16.086	1.382	12.796	20.841	World Bank (2008)
Years	15.568	7.660	1	27	

SD: standard deviation; GDP: gross domestic product; HR: human rights; INGOs: international nongovernmental organizations.

1. *Political violence in neighboring states*. We use the number of neighboring states with any type of major episodes of political violence of a country of asylum as an indicator for the effect of civil war in a given region on refugee movements. Here, major episodes of political violence are defined as 'the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly related deaths' (Marshall et al., 2010b: 2).

2. *Level of democracy*. To measure the level of democracy, we use the Polity IV project dataset (Marshall et al., 2010a). Polity scores indicate the level of democracy, which ranges from −10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).
3. *Level of human rights protection*. A country's level of human rights protection is gauged by the 'Political Terror Scale (PTS)', which is a standard-based measure (Amnesty International, various years). Countries are assigned a score of 1–5 on an ordinal scale; the higher the number, the more severe the level of human rights repression. For this study, the scale is reversed so that higher numbers indicate better protection of human rights.

Economic development. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (logged) is acquired from World Development Indictors (World Bank, 2008), and it measures the degree of economic security of each country.

Social welfare policy. We measure the level of the welfare regime in a given country of asylum using an indicator of social contribution (percentage of revenue). The indicator measures social security contributions by employee and government (World Bank, 2008).

Remittances. We employ a remittances variable to measure workers' remittances and compensation of employees (paid current US$, logged) in a given country (World Bank, 2008). This variable measures the strength of foreign workers' network in a given country.

Common language shared. To capture the network effect of shared common language, we use a dummy variable of common language shared (Moore and Shellman, 2007). This variable measures the presence and absence of at least 9 percent of the population speaking a common language across its neighboring countries Melitz and Toubal (2012).

Number of neighboring countries. To measure the geographical proximities between the sending and receiving countries, we use a variable indicating the total number of direct contiguities for a given country (Stinnett et al., 2002).

Neighbors of top 10 sending countries. Based on the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data, we create a dummy variable as to whether a country is a neighboring country of the top 10 sending countries in a given year.

Lagged recognition rates. To determine the deterring effects of the recognition rate on the number of asylum applications, we include a 1-year lagged variable of the recognition rate in the number of asylum application analysis.

Adoption of the 1967 Protocols. To assess state compliance with the standards and expectations of the international refugee regime, we create a dummy variable indicating whether the state became a member party to the 1967 Protocols.

Domestic refugee law legislation. To measure the national adoption of international refugee law, we focus on the enforcement of national legislation involving refugees, which may also capture the administrative capacity of countries. Using sources from the US Department of State Human Rights Reports (various years), World Refugee Survey (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), various years), and national legislation texts from UNHCR Refworld, we find that there are 108 countries which recognize the refugee status through their refugee laws or basic

constitutional laws as of 2009. We create a time-dependent dummy variable that assesses whether a country adopted a refugee law in a given year.

International human rights conventions. The aggregate measure of nine selected conventions related to human rights and migration is from the Human Development Report 2009 by year of ratification (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009). Each convention ratification status is coded as a dummy variable (years before ratification are coded as '0' and years after ratification are coded as '1'), and we aggregate them.

INGO membership status. The strength of a country's linkage to the world polity is routinely measured by the number of its memberships in INGOs. The INGO membership data are from the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Union of International Associations (UIA), various years).

Control variables

Refugee inflows (logged). To capture the influence of the stock of refugee asylum applications and recognition, we control for refugee shares in potential asylum-receiving countries. We obtain the annual refugee inflow data from the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, and we only consider the category of 'refugee' from the total population of concern.

Years. To control the incremental nature of refugee recognition rate and the number of refugee applications, we include *Years* (1 = 1982, 2 = 1983, … 27 = 2008) as a control variable (Clark, 2011).[10]

Size of country. Previous refugee literature routinely uses the population of a country as a control variable (Davenport et al., 2003; Schmeidl, 1997). We create a logged total population variable (World Bank, 2008).

Statistical method

Given that the world polity is still diffusing international norms, and it is expected that more countries are recognizing refugees and accepting refugee applications, we currently have limited information regarding the dependent variables. Our dependent variables – the asylum recognition rate and the number of asylum applications – are censored at the lower limit of 0.[11] Our dataset indicates that for both the asylum recognition rate and the number of asylum applications, approximately 50 percent of the observations are 0. To estimate the models of asylum recognition and asylum applications, we adopt random-effects Tobit models. Because we analyze the cross-sectional time-series data, random-effects models can observe the effects of autocorrelation between independent regressors and error terms. To avoid endogeneity problems between our dependent variables and independent variables, we use 1-year lagged independent variables, except for the dummy variables. This specification prevents our theoretical models being overruled by temporal specification.

Following Greene (2008), the structural equation for this censored regression model is

$$y_{it}^{*} = \alpha_i + x_{it-1}\beta + x_i\gamma + +\varepsilon_{it}$$

where

$$y_{it} = 0 \text{ if } y_{it}^{*} \leq 0$$

$$y_{it} = y_{it}^{*} \quad \text{if } y_{it}^{*} > 0$$

$$\varepsilon_{it} \sim N[0, \sigma^2]$$

Here, y_{it}^{*} is a latent dependent variable in country i at time t that is observed for values greater than 0 and is censored for values less than or equal to 0. While $x_{it-1}$is a vector of the lagged covariates, x_i is a vector of time-invariant covariates.β and γ are coefficients.

However, the Tobit model violates several assumptions, which might lead to inconsistent and biased estimates (Greene, 2008: 875–881). As proposed by Cragg (1971), the Tobit model can produce a problem of mis-specification of probability with its limited observations. Here, we test against the null hypothesis that the restricted model of the Tobit is true using a probit model of censoring and a truncated regression on the uncensored observations. The results lead us to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between models based on the test statistics for refugee application and for refugee recognition. We carefully review the probit and truncated regression results for both dependent variables and find that the results are similar to the reported Tobit model. Finally, to address the issue of non-normality in errors, we adopt a censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimator, which is robust to change in distributions, and is a general case of the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator (Greene, 2008: 880). To address the issue of orthogonality of independent variables, we also fit the fixed-effect Tobit models censored from below for both refugee recognition and refugee application using the NLOGIT 4.0 program. The overall results from these two sensitivity analyses for the two dependent variables are very similar to our reported models, leaving our substantial conclusion unchanged.

For additional checks on multicollinearity in our independent variables, we provide a correlation table in Table 5. There is no big concern of multicollinearity in the independent variables used in this analysis.

Results

We first begin with a discussion of Table 6, which presents the results of the random-effect Tobit analysis on the logged number of asylum applications received. Model 1 considers only the effects of variables measuring the destination countries' socio-politico-economic characteristics, which stem from a rationalist approach. Subsequently, in Models 2–6, we add a series of *world polity* variables that measure the effects of global institutional processes on the lodging of asylum applications. Throughout all the models, we include several control variables to ensure that the effects of key independent variables remain robust after controlling for obvious conditions involving asylum flows. The control variable of the number of refugee inflows is insignificant in explaining both the number of asylum applications and recognition rates, suggesting that asylum movements may diverge from the general refugee flow patterns. The population variable shows no effect on the number of refugee applications; yet, it has a significant effect on the refugee recognition rates. The size of the population in a given country matters when a country considers giving asylum status to

Table 5. Correlations index of independent variables used.

	Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	Political security index	1														
2	GDP per capita (logged)	0.71	1													
3	Welfare (% of GDP)	0.55	0.55	1												
4	Remittances	0.22	0.57	0.23	1											
5	Common language shared	−0.37	−0.27	−0.29	−0.03	1										
6	Total No. of neighboring countries	−0.11	0.12	0.19	0.38	0	1									
7	Total No. of top 10 countries	−0.5	−0.31	−0.29	−0.1	0.29	−0.03	1								
8	Recognition rate (lagged)	0.14	0.08	0.12	0.03	0.07	0.06	−0.12	1							
9	No. of refugees(inflow, logged)	−0.24	−0.04	0.03	0.31	0.31	0.29	0.25	0.07	1						
10	Population (logged)	−0.32	−0.17	−0.03	0.32	0.15	0.54	−0.1	0.03	0.43	1					
11	Time period	−0.07	−0.03	0.01	0.21	−0.05	0.06	0.01	0.07	−0.02	0.08	1				
12	1967 Conventions	0.25	0.17	0.29	−0.04	0.13	−0.01	−0.13	0.19	0.09	−0.1	0.08	1			
13	National Refugee Law	0.44	0.42	0.44	0.26	−0.09	0.07	−0.22	0.17	0.09	−0.01	0.34	0.43	1		
14	Int'l HR Conventions	0.05	0.02	0.18	0.05	0.01	0.1	−0.11	0.16	−0.03	0.11	0.75	0.4	0.43	1	
15	INGO	0.4	0.61	0.44	0.62	−0.09	0.39	−0.32	0.1	0.27	0.47	0.24	0.24	0.45	0.31	1

GDP: gross domestic product; HR: human rights; INGO: international nongovernmental organization.

Table 6. Random-effects Tobit model of asylum application, 1982–2008.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political/economic conditions						
Political security	0.609*	0.473+	0.417+	0.304	0.296	0.313
index	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.245)	(0.246)	(0.244)
GDP per capita	−0.431	0.334	0.228	0.142	0.190	−0.441
(logged)	(0.429)	(0.429)	(0.416)	(0.413)	(0.408)	(0.436)
Welfare regime (% of	0.113***	0.112***	0.126***	0.120***	0.123***	0.130***
revenue)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Networks and geographic proximity						
Remittances (current		−0.470***	−0.472***	−0.486***	−0.467***	−0.526***
US$, logged)		(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.099)
Common language		0.323	0.292	0.281	0.316	0.308
shared		(0.402)	(0.379)	(0.371)	(0.369)	(0.369)
No. of neighboring		0.483***	0.483***	0.532***	0.539***	0.489***
countries		(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.140)
Neighbors of top 10		−0.562+	−0.519	−0.664*	−0.574+	−0.522
sending countries		(0.335)	(0.333)	(0.331)	(0.334)	(0.332)
Deterrence and influx						
Recognition rate		0.018***	0.016***	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***
($t-1$)		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
World polity linkages			1.910***	1.424**	0.910+	0.309
1967 Protocol			(0.431)	(0.440)	(0.481)	(0.497)
adoption				1.089***	1.118***	0.997***
Domestic Refugee				(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)
Law					0.271*	0.277**
Int'l HR Conventions					(0.106)	(0.106)
						1.658***
INGOs (logged)						(0.399)
Controls						
Refugee inflows	0.098	0.108	0.081	0.105	0.099	0.105
(logged)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Population (logged)	0.974*	0.384	0.432	0.314	0.211	−0.027
	(0.486)	(0.483)	(0.460)	(0.451)	(0.449)	(0.459)
Years	0.532***	0.563***	0.549***	0.517***	0.466***	0.433***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Constant	−24.143**	−16.091*	−17.197*	−14.201+	−13.776+	−13.689+
	(8.241)	(8.046)	(7.630)	(7.509)	(7.472)	(7.514)
No. of observations	1966	1966	1966	1966	1966	1966
Log likelihood	−2673.119	−2646.489	−2636.627	−2627.810	−2624.491	−2614.773
No. of countries	89	89	89	89	89	89

GDP: gross domestic product; HR: human rights; INGOs: international nongovernmental organizations.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed test). All independent variables are one-year lagged.
+$p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

asylum seekers. The time-control variable of years indicates the incremental nature of asylum applications and asylum recognition rates during 1982–2008; yet, its effect becomes insignificant when world polity linkage variables are added in recognition models in Table 7. This suggests that

Table 7. Random-effects Tobit model of asylum recognition rate, 1982–2008.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political/economic conditions						
Political security index	6.567***	4.539**	4.746**	4.816**	4.829**	4.829**
	(1.624)	(1.713)	(1.683)	(1.687)	(1.682)	(1.682)
GDP per capita (logged)	−1.090	1.161	0.308	0.412	0.535	0.515
	(2.023)	(2.992)	(2.373)	(2.418)	(2.319)	(2.466)
Welfare regime (% of revenue)	0.069	−0.146	0.110	0.109	0.147	0.147
	(0.154)	(0.205)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Networks and geographic proximity						
Remittances (current US$, logged)		−0.760	−0.886	−0.838	−0.749	−0.751
		(0.701)	(0.679)	(0.682)	(0.680)	(0.686)
Common language shared		−2.472	−1.157	−1.275	−0.894	−0.896
		(3.229)	(2.172)	(2.236)	(2.072)	(2.074)
No. of neighboring countries		−5.051***	−3.482**	−3.650**	−3.309**	−3.314**
		(1.210)	(1.098)	(1.128)	(1.062)	(1.075)
Neighbors of top 10 sending countries		−5.105*	−5.081*	−4.840+	−4.464+	−4.462+
		(2.476)	(2.487)	(2.500)	(2.513)	(2.514)
World polity linkages						
1967 Protocol adoption			18.690***	19.197***	16.476***	16.452***
			(3.485)	(3.535)	(3.668)	(3.800)
Domestic Refugee Law				−1.758	−1.548	−1.553
				(1.874)	(1.868)	(1.878)
Int'l HR Conventions					1.987*	1.987*
					(0.780)	(0.781)
INGOs (logged)						0.055
						(2.271)
Controls						
Refugee inflows (logged)	−0.191	−0.261	−0.250	−0.317	−0.315	−0.316
	(0.482)	(0.502)	(0.493)	(0.499)	(0.498)	(0.498)
Population (logged)	8.143**	21.454**	14.152***	14.789***	13.073***	13.076***
	(2.779)	(6.989)	(4.181)	(4.367)	(3.884)	(3.884)
Years	0.618***	0.651***	0.611***	0.653***	0.288	0.287
	(0.095)	(0.128)	(0.110)	(0.119)	(0.185)	(0.189)
Constant	−143.871**	−312.832**	−217.410***	−229.329***	−209.130***	−208.500***
	(45.239)	(97.095)	(60.956)	(64.641)	(57.049)	(56.996)
No. of observations	1966	1966	1966	1966	1966	1966
Log likelihood	−4823.845	−4808.464	−4793.242	−4792.798	−4789.553	−4789.552
No. of Countries	89	89	89	89	89	89

GDP: gross domestic product; HR: human rights; INGOs: international nongovernmental organizations.
Standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed test).
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

there is no consistent increasing trend in the asylum recognition rates when the models take account of world linkage variables of international human rights conventions, and INGOs memberships. We present Model 6 as the best-fitting model because it includes all the variables that capture a multitude of socio-politico-economic as well as the global institutional processes. The full Model 6 substantially improves upon Model 1, which neglects global institutional processes (Likelihood-ratio test chi-square (9) = 116.69, $p > 0.001$). Because we treat Model 6 as the best-fitting model, we concentrate on interpreting the results from this model.[12]

In Model 6, it appears that the political security index measured by the levels of political violence, democracy, and human rights is insignificant, and this result does not support Hypotheses (1a), (1b), and (1c). Model 1 also considers two variables that measure the economic affluence of host countries, and their effects are mixed. Unlike the predictions in Hypothesis (1d), GDP per capita is not a significant factor; yet, consistent with Hypothesis (1e), the welfare variable appears to be positively significant. It suggests that asylum applicants, as *rational actors*, do not consider simple economic affluence, as much as the affluence appropriated for humanitarian policy. In fact, generous welfare provisions render a destination country more attractive.

Subsequently, Model 6 includes four variables measuring networks and geographical proximity, which serve as obvious constraints linking (potentially) the sending and host countries. Contrary to the predictions in Hypothesis 3, two measures of the ethnic network show some unexpected results: common language shared shows no statistically significant effects, whereas the remittance shows a significant, yet an unexpected negative effect, on asylum applications. With regard to the unexpected negative effect of the remittance, we suspect that the volumes of the recruited foreign workers' remittances and compensations might vary with the simple affluence measured by GDP per capita, which showed insignificant negative effects in Model 6. In fact, the top remittance paid countries in the 2000s were countries with substantially less refugee acceptance rates (e.g. Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia). When we also consider the nature of our data that examine destination countries' *monadic* characteristics, rather than the *dyadic* characteristics of the country pair, the lack of network variables linking a sending country to a hosting country might also be responsible for the observed results.

Partially consistent with the predictions in Hypothesis 5, reflecting the idea that geographical proximity involves an obvious impetus for lodging asylum applications, the total number of neighboring countries shows a positively significant effect; however, the number of the top 10 refugee-sending neighboring countries does not achieve a statistically significant effect. Consistent with the predictions in Hypothesis 7, the lodging of asylum applications is positively associated with the recognition rates. Asylum seekers find countries with higher recognition rates as more attractive than those with lower recognition rates; deterrence measures captured by the recognition rates indeed raise the cost of migration, reducing the number of asylum applications. Note, however, the effects of this policy variable appears to be rather marginal, which is consistent with Toshkov's (2013) recent findings; his study confirmed that the effects of the recognition rates on asylum shares are small and thus offer limited practical significance.

To examine whether countries with closer ties to world polity attract asylum applications, we add a series of global institutional variables, including the 1967 Protocols ratification, domestic refugee law, countries' ratification of human rights conventions, and their memberships in INGOs. We first examine the effects of country's ratification of the 1967 Protocol. It shows the expected positive significant effects in Models 3–5; however, its effect withers away when controlled with all the world polity measures in Model 6. Note the robust effects of state legislation of refugee law, suggesting that countries equipped with national refugee law attract asylum seekers.

Both countries' ratification of key human rights instruments and their membership in INGOs show expected positive effects. Taken together, the extent to which countries are connected to

world polity and/or the international refugee regime seems to significantly contribute to inviting more applications from asylum seekers, supporting Hypothesis 8. Note that this is so, despite the consideration of all the rationalist of variables in Model 6.

Table 7 shows the results of the random-effects Tobit-regression models for the asylum recognition rates. The ways in which the models are organized correspond to the analysis of asylum applications in Table 6; the goal is to compare and contrast a rational framework and world polity approach in explaining the degree to which countries accept the filed asylum applications. We also present Model 6 with all the variables as the best-fitting model; hence, we focus on interpreting the results from this model. Model 6 significantly improves on Models 1–5 (Likelihood-ratio test chi-square (8) = 68.59, $p < 0.001$).

As predicted in Hypotheses (2a), (2b), and (2c), the political security index involving political violence, democracy, and human rights has a positively significant effect on recognition rates. Its effects are robust throughout all the models, and the magnitude of the coefficients is the biggest among the four variables considered for measuring the political and economic conditions of destination countries. Specifically, results indicate that a one-point increase in the political security index leads to a 7 percent increase in the refugee recognition rates. Diverging from the predictions in Hypotheses (2d) and (2e), both the effects of GDP per capita and welfare regime are insignificant in Model 6.

Overall, we find that political factors are more influential than economic conditions when considering policy preferences of receiving countries. This finding is consistent with those reported by Hix and Noury (2007) that political considerations relative to economic interests ultimately shape migration policy outcomes measured by several migration integration legislations in the European Parliament. To the extent that citizens support democracy and human rights in a less-violent political environment, it encourages countries to take a more lenient stance toward asylum seekers.

In Model 6, the variables that stem from the network and geographical proximity approaches show some mixed results. The effects of remittances and common language are far from achieving statistical significance, refuting Hypothesis 4. However, supporting Hypothesis 6, which champions the salience of geographical proximity, both the number of bordering countries and that of the top 10 refugee-sending neighboring countries show the expected negatively significant effects. Affected by the increasing burden, the countries, which are more exposed to the influx of refugees, are less likely to grant legal status to asylum seekers.

In Models 2–6, we also test the effects of the world polity variables on countries' recognition rates. As in the analysis of asylum applications, the influence of global institutional processes is noteworthy; yet, a different pattern emerges. Both ratifiers of the UN *nonrefoulement* treaty (the 1967 Protocol) and high-profile countries on the ratification of human rights treaties substantially increase the probability that countries accept more asylum applications than the nonratifiers of the 1967 Protocol and lukewarm ratifiers of human rights instruments. On average, signatory states of the 1967 Protocols have a 20 percent higher refugee recognition rate than nonsignatory states. By contrast, the variable for the national legislation of refugee law shows no significant effect in the unexpected negative direction, indicating potentially the existence of decoupling between the enforcement of national legislation and its implementation (Bromley and Powell, 2012; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The insignificant effects of INGO memberships also point to a possibility that the national penetration of the world polity might be somewhat limited.[13] Taken together, Hypothesis 9 receives a partial support.

Conclusion

This study sought to explain the complex motivations underlying asylum seekers' filing of refugee applications and countries' recognition of convention refugee status using several theoretical

possibilities, including world polity institutionalism. With respect to the effects of destination countries' socio-politico-economic characteristics, we find several interesting results from the multivariate analyses: asylum seekers favor countries with better welfare as well as bordering countries, but not necessarily the ones with political security and affluent economy.

In turn, countries with political stability, particularly the ones remote from refugee-sending countries rather than countries with higher levels of GDP and welfare provisions, and refugee networks appear to be more favorable nations in recognizing the legal status of asylum seekers at home. As predicted, asylum recognition rates positively influence asylum applications. Taken together, this supports previous studies that demonstrate the effects of socio-politico-economic conditions as well as other obvious constraints (e.g. geographical proximity) involving destination countries; however, their effects appear weaker when the outcome involves countries' recognition of asylum seekers' legal status.

With regard to the predictions from world polity institutionalism, we find that asylum seekers prefer such *globally enculturated* countries as the ones that pass domestic refugee laws, ratify more human rights treaties, and have greater memberships in INGOs, but not the countries that endorse the 1967 Protocol. As for the country response, we note mixed results: countries ratifying the 1967 Protocol and more human rights treaties show a higher propensity to recognize asylum; however, those that pass domestic refugee laws, and have higher memberships in INGOs are not more likely to do so.

Note that contrary to the results showing asylum seekers' preferences for countries with national refugee legislation and a closer link to the global civil society measured by INGOs, those preferred countries show reluctance to accept them on their soil. Here, we suspect the existence of decoupling between policies or orientations of potential receiving countries and their actual implementation. The fact that countries equipped with national law relating to asylum seekers are not more likely to grant refugee status is striking; yet, it is consistent with observations in which several European governments implemented changes in the national legislation as a way to curb asylum flows (Castles et al., 2003). These results also lead us to speculate that the refugee issue may be so fundamental to the identity of countries, that they might jealously guard their sovereignty rather than simply surrender to external standards.

Despite the possibility of decoupling, our overall findings suggest that world polity is indeed at work, and exerts influence over the choices of asylum seekers and policy responses from potential host countries. The dramatic expansion of countries equipped with asylum recognition procedures for the last two decades is indicative of the salience of the world polity which champions progress, justice, human rights, and development. Research suggests that asylum seekers, as opposed to refugees in general, have a degree of control over where to go and how to travel (Robinson and Segrott, 2002). During a long journey to the final destination, they are presented with opportunities to review the options available to them, and to consider the conditions of potential receiving countries. In the meantime, numerous migration agents play a role in informing asylum seekers of the options. Such agents are not confined to conventional people, such as friends and family members, travel agents, brokers, labor recruiters, interpreters, and priests; they also include UNHCR agents, IGO/INGO staffers, law firm lawyers, and law school professors/students. We suspect the latter group of *global norm entrepreneurs* might communicate global norms and standards, including refugee laws, organizations, and relevant state responsibilities, with asylum seekers. Further research, however, needs to be conducted to document the underlying mechanism linking asylum choices as well as policy responses to the activities of such global agents.

Our findings provide a reflection on the popular theme of 'shrinking of European generosity' in the refugee literature (Edwards, 2005; Kjaerum, 2002; Noll, 2003). Since the early 1990s, European policy makers have restricted access to refugee status. The measures include temporary protection programs, nonarrival policies, cooperation with safe third countries, and limiting employment

opportunities as well as welfare provisions (Castles et al., 2003). Such measures obviously tarnish the principle of 'nonrefoulement'. Our analysis further supports this popular axiom, and raises concerns for the future prospectus of refugees and asylum seekers because the sluggish economy and the subsequent budget crisis might exacerbate the ever-worsening situation.

We finally consider the title of this article, 'Love Thy Neighbor'. As suggested by the irrelevancy of GDP and welfare regime, affluent countries appear to refrain from granting protection for asylum seekers. If 'burden-sharing' is a reasonable solution among European countries, affluent countries who can better afford hosting refugees might be able to choose a similar strategy. Perhaps, well-to-do countries both in European and non-European regions may also play the role of the Good Samaritan in helping uprooted global neighbors. Furthermore, the same logic might be applied to the more globalized countries because our analyses revealed that such countries with national refugee legislation as well as with closer ties to INGOs appear not to play the role of the Good Samaritan.

One could rightfully foresee a more dismal future for the world society in the face of the concurring shocking and life-altering events globally taking place: the civil wars in North Africa and Central Africa; the subsequent enormous outflow of refugees and resultant lowering tolerance of host countries; and, finally, the pivotal global economic downturn of developed and developing countries alike. Current events indeed serve as a litmus test for the international society in general and the international refugee regime in particular. Depending on the future empowerment of the global society and their moral authority in disseminating the value of proper obligations as global citizens, countries will come to terms with how to balance sovereignty costs and legitimacy costs, on one hand, and short-term economic interests and long-term humanitarian interests, on the other.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association annual meeting in Las Vegas in August 2011 and the Korean Association of International Studies International Conference on War, Peace, and Human Rights after the Cold War in Seoul, Korea in June 2011. We are grateful for feedback received from John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, John Boli, Patricia Bromley, Paul Y. Chang, Patricia Goedde, and Chris Borhani.

Funding

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2011-332-B00281).

Notes

1. In the face of data limitations, most asylum studies using dyadic data focus more on employing data from either European asylum destinations or a subset of destination countries (Hatton, 2004, 2009; Neumayer, 2004, 2005a) as opposed to analyzing global statistics.
2. This figure includes people in refugee-like situations in 2007–2009.
3. Hatton (2009) demonstrates that European countries witnessed the reduction of the number of asylum applications by 25 percent in the mid-2000s compared with the early 1990s in conjunction with a series of policy measures designed to dampen asylum inflows, such as requiring visas and shifting the burden to other 'safe' countries.
4. Despite countries' efforts to incorporate the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol into their domestic laws, human rights lawyers and scholars have criticized that refugee laws as too embedded in domestic immigration law and institutions (Anker, 2002).
5. We exclude the variable of asylum applications in the analysis of recognition rates for two reasons: first, despite a recent interest in deciphering the intrinsic interconnectedness between asylum lodging and

recognition (Toshkov, 2013), the theoretical justification fails to surface; second, the number of asylum applications possibly overlaps with the measures of geographical proximity. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing the second point to our attention.

6. Several prominent INGOs advocating the rights and welfare of refugees include United Nations International Emergency Children's Fund (UNICEF), WFP (United Nations World Food Program), and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (UNHCR, 2010b: 51).
7. Based on the UNHCR statistics, the number of countries receiving asylum applications remained 19 in 1985, increased to 30 in 1995, and reached 102 in 2008.
8. Included countries are: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
9. Cronbach's alpha is 0.63.
10. Including the lagged dependent variables ($t - 1$) can be another option; however, it is possible that both lagged dependent variables are highly correlated with the other lagged dependent variables in the models. For example, if we include a lagged recognition rate in the recognition rate model, it is automatically correlated with the lagged number of applications in the recognition rate model and brings confusion to the whole model.
11. We distinguished the values of 0 in the original dataset from the assigned value of 0 by inputting $-1.00e{-}07$ (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
12. To explore whether the level of cross-border economic activities has an effect on the asylum movement, we included the variables of trade and investment volumes in host countries. Because we found no relevancy of these variables, we chose not to include these into the equations reported in Tables 2 and 3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this idea.
13. We re-ran the models, replacing the general INGOs variable with the sector-specific – human rights – INGOs variable (Murdie and Bhasin, 2011) but did not find substantial differences regarding the effects of the world polity variables. We report these results in Appendix Tables 8 and 9. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this further step.

References

Albert M (2010) *Prima facie determination of refugee status*. Working paper series no. 55. Available at: http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers-folder_contents/RSCworkingpaper55.pdf (accessed 10 October 2013).

Amnesty International (various years) *Amnesty International Report*. London: Amnesty International Publications.

Anker DE (2002) Refugee law, gender, and the human rights paradigm. *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 15: 133–154.

Barnett MN and Finnemore M (1999) The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization* 53: 699–732.

Barnett MN and Finnemore M (2004) *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Basok T (1990) Welcome some and reject others: Constraints and interests influencing Costa Rican policies on refugees. *International Migration Review* 24: 722–747.

Bocker A and Havinga T (1998) Asylum applications in the European Union: Patterns and trends and the effects of policy measures. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 11: 245–266.

Boli J and Thomas GM (1997) World culture in the world polity: A century of international non-governmental organization. *American Sociological Review* 62(2): 171–190.

Borjas GJ (1989) Economic theory and international migration. *International Migration Review* 23: 457–485.

Boswell C (2003) Burden-sharing in the European Union: Lessons from the German and UK experience. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 16: 316–335.

Bromley P, Meyer JW and Ramirez FO (2011) Student centrism in social science textbooks: 1970–2005. *Social Forces* 90(2): 1–24.

Bromley P and Powell WW (2012) From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: *Decoupling in the contemporary world. The Academy of Management Annals* 6(1): 483–530.

Cameron CA and Trivedi PK (2010) *Microeconometrics Using Stata*. Austin, TX: Stata Press.

Castles S, Crawley H and Loughna S (2003) *States of Conflict: Causes and Patterns of Forced Migration to the EU and Policy Responses*. London: IPPR.

Clark R (2011) Child labor in the world polity: Decline and persistence, 1980–200. *Social Forces* 89(3): 1033–1055.

Cole WM (2005) Sovereignty relinquished? Explaining commitment to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966–1999. *American Sociological Review* 70(3): 472–495.

Correlates of War Project. Direct contiguity data, 1816–2006, version 3.1. Available at: http://correlatesofwar.org (accessed 12 February 2012).

Cragg JG (1971) Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods. *Econometrica* 39: 829–844.

Davenport CA, Moore WH and Poe SC (2003) Sometimes you just have to leave: Domestic threats and forced migration, 1964–1989. *International Interactions* 29: 27–55.

Delouvin P (2000) Evolution of asylum in France. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13: 61–73.

Dowty A and Loescher G (1996) Refugee flows as grounds for international action. *International Security* 21: 43–71.

Edwards A (2005) Human rights, refugees, and the right 'to enjoy' asylum. *International Journal of Refugee* 17: 293–330.

Field O and Edwards A (2006) *Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4472e8b84.html (accessed 21 February 2012).

Gibney MJ (2008) Asylum and the expansion of deportation in the United Kingdom. *Government and Opposition* 43(2): 146–167.

Gordenker L (1976) International aid and national decisions: Development programs in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gordenker L (1987) *Refugees in International Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Greene WH (2008) *Econometric Analysis*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gurak DT and Caces F (1992) Migration networks and the shaping of migration systems. In: Kritz MM, Lim LL and Zlotnick H (eds) *International Migration Systems: A Global Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 150–176.

Hatton TJ (2004) Seeking asylum in Europe. *Economic Policy* 19(38): 5–62.

Hatton TJ (2009) The rise and fall of asylum: What happened and why? *Economic Journal* 119(February): 183–213.

Hein J (1993) Refugees, immigrants, and the state. *Annual Review of Sociology* 19: 43–59.

Hix S and Noury A (2007) Politics, not economic interests: Determinants of migration policies in the European Union. *International Migration Review* 41(1): 182–205.

Holzer T, Schneider G and Widmer T (2000) The impact of legislative deterrence measures on the number of asylum seekers in Switzerland. *International Migration Review* 34: 1182–1216.

Hugo GJ (1981) Village-community ties, village norms and ethnic and social networks: A review of evidence from the third world. In: De Jong G and Gardner G (eds) *Migration Decision-Making*. New York: Pergamon Press, pp. 186–224.

Jacobsen K (1994) *The Impact of Refugees on the Environment: A Review of the Evidence*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group.

Jacobsen K (1996) Factors influencing the policy responses of host governments to mass refugee influxes. *International Migration Review* 30: 655–678.

Joly D, Nettleton C and Poulton H (1992) *Refugees: Asylum in Europe?* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Khan AS (1981) *Study on human rights and massive exodus: Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories*. Special report to the Commission on Human Rights, 38th session. United Nations Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1503 (accessed 21 February 2012).

Kim K and Cohen JE (2010) Determinants of international migration flows and from industrialized countries: A panel data approach beyond gravity. *International Migration Review* 44(4): 8899–8932.

Kjaerum M (2002) Refugee protection between state interests and human rights: Where is Europe heading? *Human Rights Quarterly* 24: 513–536.

Koo JW and Ramirez FO (2009) National incorporation of global human rights: Worldwide adoptions of national human rights institutions, 1966–2004. *Social Forces* 87: 1321–1354.

Koser K (1997) Social networks and the asylum cycle: The case of Iranians in the Netherlands. *International Migration Review* 31: 591–611.

Marshall MG, Gurr TR and Jaggers K (2010a) Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2009 (Computer file). Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed 22 March 2010).

Marshall MG, Gurr TR and Jaggers K (2010b) Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2009 (Dataset user's manual). Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf (accessed 22 March 2010).

Martin SF and Schoenholtz AI (1999) Asylum in practice: Success, failures, and the challenges ahead. *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 14: 589–617.

Melitz J and Toubal F (2012) Native language, spoken language, translation and trade. CEPII, Working Papers 2012–17. Available at: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=19#sthash.CzViZ4al.dpuf (accessed 2 March 2013).

Meyer JW (2010) World society, institutional theories, and the actor. *Annual Review of Sociology* 36: 1–20.

Meyer JW and Jepperson RL (2000) The 'actors' of modern society: The cultural construction of social agency. *Sociological Theory* 18(1): 100–120.

Meyer JW and Rowan B (1977) Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology* 83(2): 340–363.

Moon R and Koo JW (2011) Civic education and human rights: Constructing citizenship in the Republic of Korea. *Comparative Education Review* 55(4): 574–599.

Moore WH and Shellman SM (2004) Fear of persecution: Forced migration, 1952–1995. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 723–745.

Moore WH and Shellman SM (2006) Refugee or internally displaced person? to where should one flee? *Comparative Political Studies* 39(5): 599–622.

Moore WH and Shellman SM (2007) Whither will they go? A global study of refugees' destinations, 1965–1995. *International Studies Quarterly* 51: 811–834.

Murdie A and Bhasin T (2011) Aiding and abetting: Human rights INGOs and domestic protest. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(2): 163–191.

Neumayer E (2004) Asylum destination choice. *European Union Politics* 5(2): 155–180.

Neumayer E (2005a) Asylum recognition rates in Western Europe: Their determinants, variation, and lack of convergence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 43–66.

Neumayer E (2005b) Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to western Europe. *International Studies Quarterly* 49: 389–409.

Noll G (2003) Risky games? A theoretical approach to burden-sharing in the asylum field. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 16: 236–252.

Norusis M (2005) *SPSS 14.0 Statistical Procedures Companion*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Ramakers J (1997) The challenges of refugee protection in Belgium. In: Muss P (ed.) *Exclusion and Inclusion of Refugees in Contemporary Europe*. Utrecht: European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, pp. 96–116.

Roberts A (1998) More refugees, less asylum: A regime in transformation. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 11(4): 375–395.

Robinson V and Segrott J (2002) *Understanding the Decision-Making of Asylum Seekers* (Home Office Research Study 243). London: Home Office.

Scheinman RS (1983) Refugees: Goodbye to the good old days. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 467: 78–88.

Schmeidl S (1997) Exploring the causes of forced migration: A pooled time-series analysis, 1971–1990. *Social Science Quarterly* 78: 284–308.

Schuster L (2000) A comparative analysis of the asylum policy of seven European governments. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13: 118–132.

Soysal YN (2012) Citizenship, immigration, and the European social project: Rights and obligations of individuality. *British Journal of Sociology* 63(1): 1–21.

Stainsby R (2009) UNHCR and individual refugee status determination. *Forced Migration Review* 32: 52–53.

Stinnett DM, Tir J, Schafer P, et al. (2002) The correlates of war project direct contiguity data, version 3. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2): 58–66.

Suárez DF, Ramirez FO and Koo JW (2009) UNESCO and the associated schools project: Symbolic affirmation of world community, international understanding, and human rights. *Sociology of Education* 82: 197–216.

Thielemann ER (2004) Why asylum policy harmonization undermines refugee burden-sharing. *European Journal of Migration and Law* 6: 47–65.

Toshkov DD (2013) The dynamic relationship between asylum applications and recognition rates in Europe (1987–2010). *European Union Politics* DOI: 1465116513511710.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009) *Human Development Report 2009*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

UNHCR. UNHCR statistical online population database. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a013eb06.html (accessed 9 April 2011).

UNHCR (2010a) *2009 Global Trends*. Geneva: UNHCR.

UNHCR (2010b) *UNHCR Global Report 2009*. Geneva: UNHCR.

UNHCR (2011) States parties to the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 protocol. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.pdf (accessed 11 April 2011).

UNHCR (various years) *UNHCR Statistical Yearbook*. Geneva: UNHCR.

Union of International Associations (UIA) Online database. Available at: http://www.uia.be/sites/uia.be/db/db/x.php (accessed 10 March 2010).

Union of International Associations (UIA) (various years) *Yearbook of International Associations*. Munich: K.G. Saur.

US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) (various years) *World Refugee Survey*. Arlington, VA: USCRI.

US Department of State (2013) U.S. refugee admissions program FAQs. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2013/210135.htm (accessed 10 October 2013).

US Department of State (various years) *Human Rights Reports*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

Vogler M and Rotte R (2000) The effects of development on migration: Theoretical issues and new empirical evidence. *Journal of Population Economics* 13: 485–508.

Waldron S and Hasci NA (1995) *Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa: State of the Art Literature Review*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Wood WB (1994) Forced migration: Local conflict and international dilemmas. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84(4): 607–634.

World Bank (2008) *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Zolberg AR, Suhrke A and Aguayo S (1989) *Escape from Violence Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Appendix 1

Table 8. Random-effects Tobit model of asylum application, 1990–2008.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political/economic conditions						
Political security index	1.704***	0.865***	0.765***	0.624***	0.656***	0.519+
	(0.137)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.274)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.220*	0.382	0.358	0.276	0.255	−0.463
	(0.090)	(0.246)	(0.241)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.569)
Welfare regime (% of revenue)	0.067***	0.070***	0.057**	0.046**	0.047**	0.095**
	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)
Networks and geographic proximity						
Remittances (current US$, logged)		−0.152*	−0.169*	−0.162*	−0.166*	−0.344**
		(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.117)
Common language shared		0.423*	0.300+	0.293+	0.292+	−0.076
		(0.169)	(0.166)	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.435)
Numbers of neighboring countries		0.274**	0.264**	0.269**	0.265**	0.622**
		(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.191)
Neighbors of top 10 sending countries		−0.425	−0.403	−0.540*	−0.570*	−0.908*
		(0.273)	(0.268)	(0.263)	(0.264)	(0.355)
Deterrence and influx						
Recognition rate ($t-1$)		0.017***	0.016***	0.019***	0.019***	0.020***
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
World polity linkages						
1967 Protocol adoption			2.098***	1.312***	1.498***	1.390**
			(0.319)	(0.326)	(0.361)	(0.504)
Domestic Refugee Law				1.622***	1.609***	1.146***
				(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.271)
Int'l HR Conventions					−0.091	0.032
					(0.077)	(0.119)
HRINGOs (logged)						0.329***
						(0.078)
Controls						
Refugee inflows (logged)	0.400***	0.051	0.025	0.038	0.039	0.033
	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.075)
Population (logged)	0.096+	−0.136	−0.013	−0.076	−0.053	−0.554
	(0.058)	(0.228)	(0.220)	(0.213)	(0.212)	(0.531)
Years	0.272***	0.296***	0.281***	0.235***	0.250***	0.426***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.030)
Constant	−9.291***	−4.009	−6.175	−3.850	−3.822	4.012
	(1.151)	(4.047)	(3.938)	(3.798)	(3.769)	(9.434)
No. of observations	1329	1329	1329	1329	1329	1329
Log likelihood	−3203.507	−2897.554	−2876.222	−2844.194	−2843.490	−2058.651
No. of countries	73	73	73	73	73	73

GDP: gross domestic product; HR: human rights; HRINGOs: human rights international nongovernmental organizations.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed test). All independent variables are one-year lagged.
+$p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix 2

Table 9. Random-effects Tobit model of refugee recognition rate, 1990–2008.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political/economic conditions						
Political security index	3.273+	2.821	2.727	2.909	2.747	2.745
	(1.911)	(1.936)	(1.931)	(1.935)	(1.937)	(1.939)
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.256	0.232	−0.363	−0.102	0.004	0.282
	(2.122)	(2.385)	(2.290)	(2.321)	(2.311)	(2.424)
Welfare regime (% of revenue)	0.449**	0.458**	0.402**	0.423**	0.417**	0.428**
	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.157)
Networks and geographic proximity						
Remittances (current US$, logged)		−0.007	−0.074	−0.099	0.036	0.025
		(0.792)	(0.795)	(0.794)	(0.798)	(0.798)
Common language shared		2.586	2.091	2.105	2.158	2.350
		(1.609)	(1.508)	(1.535)	(1.518)	(1.596)
Numbers of neighboring countries		−0.057	0.003	−0.037	0.017	0.040
		(0.755)	(0.707)	(0.719)	(0.710)	(0.713)
Neighbors' of top 10 sending countries		−6.555*	−6.731**	−6.481*	−6.098*	−6.136*
		(2.551)	(2.569)	(2.573)	(2.588)	(2.590)
World polity linkages			10.996***	12.007***	9.151*	9.049*
1967 Protocol adoption			(3.319)	(3.388)	(3.732)	(3.742)
				−2.745	−2.668	−2.645
Domestic Refugee Law				(1.921)	(1.918)	(1.919)
					1.612+	1.616+
Int'l HR Conventions					(0.884)	(0.884)
						−0.132
HRINGOs (logged)						(0.336)
Controls						
Refugee inflows (logged)	0.103	0.123	0.015	−0.015	−0.050	−0.034
	(0.500)	(0.505)	(0.502)	(0.505)	(0.505)	(0.508)
Population (logged)	0.940	0.373	0.650	0.870	0.503	0.613
	(1.850)	(2.109)	(1.987)	(2.027)	(2.011)	(2.035)
Years	0.462***	0.480***	0.409**	0.502***	0.249	0.249
	(0.121)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.149)	(0.202)	(0.202)
Constant	−143.871**	−312.832**	−217.410***	−229.329***	−209.130***	−208.500***
	(45.239)	(97.095)	(60.956)	(64.641)	(57.049)	(56.996)
No. of observations	1329	1329	1329	1329	1329	1329
Log likelihood	−3571.237	−3566.809	−3561.130	−3560.110	−3558.428	−3558.350
No. of countries	73	73	73	73	73	73

GDP: gross domestic product; HR: human rights; HRINGOs: human rights international nongovernmental organizations.
Standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed tests).
+$p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.