Mukopadhyay 교수, Decision Sciences Institute의 2009 Distinguished Paper Award 수상
- SKK GSB
- Hit3282
- 2009-11-25
축하합니다.
Decision Science 분야의 Samar Mukopadhyay 교수는 동 분야에서 가장 권위있는 Decision Sciences Institute의 2009년 Best Papers & Distinguished Paper Award 수상자로 선정되었습니다.
Samar Mukopadhyay는 그동안 수 편의 Top-tier journal에 논문을 발표하며 우수한 연구 성과를 축적해 오고 있습니다.
논문 주제:
Contracting, Salesforce Incentives, and Inventory Planning Under Supply Chain Competition
연구 참여자:
Ying Zhang (University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee)
Samar Mukopadhyay (Sungkyunkwan University SKK GSB)
논문 주요 내용:
We investigate contracting, salesforce incentives, and inventory planning in two competing supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one salesforce. The two supply chains are identical, except that they may have different contract types. We use a non-cooperative game method to study this topic. In the first stage, the manufacturers decide which contract type to choose. Then, in the next stage, given the contract type structure created in the first stage, the manufacturers offer contracts to their salesforces and the salesforces engage in a competition. We analyze the game for two different contract types – a single linear contract and a menu of linear contracts. We find that the firms prefer a menu of linear contracts when the competition is not intense and good market condition is very likely. We also find that as the utility cost of uncertainty increases, the likelihood of using pooled contracts decreases because of the increase in risk premium. Risk aversions and uncertainties affect the profits in two ways: directly through risk premium, and indirectly through the sale rep’s selling efforts.
Decision Science 분야의 Samar Mukopadhyay 교수는 동 분야에서 가장 권위있는 Decision Sciences Institute의 2009년 Best Papers & Distinguished Paper Award 수상자로 선정되었습니다.
Samar Mukopadhyay는 그동안 수 편의 Top-tier journal에 논문을 발표하며 우수한 연구 성과를 축적해 오고 있습니다.
논문 주제:
Contracting, Salesforce Incentives, and Inventory Planning Under Supply Chain Competition
연구 참여자:
Ying Zhang (University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee)
Samar Mukopadhyay (Sungkyunkwan University SKK GSB)
논문 주요 내용:
We investigate contracting, salesforce incentives, and inventory planning in two competing supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one salesforce. The two supply chains are identical, except that they may have different contract types. We use a non-cooperative game method to study this topic. In the first stage, the manufacturers decide which contract type to choose. Then, in the next stage, given the contract type structure created in the first stage, the manufacturers offer contracts to their salesforces and the salesforces engage in a competition. We analyze the game for two different contract types – a single linear contract and a menu of linear contracts. We find that the firms prefer a menu of linear contracts when the competition is not intense and good market condition is very likely. We also find that as the utility cost of uncertainty increases, the likelihood of using pooled contracts decreases because of the increase in risk premium. Risk aversions and uncertainties affect the profits in two ways: directly through risk premium, and indirectly through the sale rep’s selling efforts.