"철학과인문교육" 연구소 제20회 논문발표회 (2월 2일)
- 철학과
- 조회수1594
- 2024-01-23
성균관대학교 "철학과인문교육" 연구소의 제20회 논문발표회를 2월 2일(금요일) 12:50~18:00에 퇴계인문관 31709호에서 개최하게 되어 아래와 같이 알려드립니다.
이번 발표회에서는 김영성, 인유림, 두 분의 대학원생과, 박성수, 남기혁, 이병덕 선생님 이렇게 총 다섯 분을 모시고 아래와 같이 발표를 진행하고자 합니다. 학생분들과 선생님들의 많은 관심과 참여 부탁드립니다.
일 시: 2024년 2월 2일 금요일 오후 12:50~6:00
장 소: 성균관대학교 퇴계인문관 7층 709호(#31709)
일 정:
12:50~1:00 등록 및 개회 인사
1:00~1:45 김영성 (성균관대 박사수료)
합의 이론을 통해 친구와 연인 구분하기
1:45~2:30 인유림 (성균관대 석사수료)
How to Achieve Practical Rationality
2:40~3:40 남기혁 (연세대)
The Primitivist’s Dialectic
3:50~4:50 박성수 (성균관대/연세대)
Against an Anti-Realist Account of Theft in Virtual Reality: Why Virtual Objects Exist
5:00~6:00 이병덕 (성균관대)
A Kantian Critique of Benatar’s Annihilation Account
김영성
발표 제목: 합의 이론을 통해 친구와 연인 구분하기
초록: 본고에서는 '친구와 연인의 구분에 의한 논증'이 제시된다. 이 논증에 의하면, 자발적이고 친밀한 인간관계에 대한 기존의 모든 이론들은 친구관계와 연애관계를 적절히 구분해줄 수 없다는 점에서 문제가 있다. 나의 합의 이론은 그렇지 않다.
인유림
발표 제목: How to Achieve Practical Rationality
초록: This paper deals with how to achieve practical rationality, specially focusing on the discussion surrounding the formulation of a requirement for means-end coherence (“MEC” for short). A significant amount of recent debate has focused on how to formulate this requirement, with two views predominant among philosophers: narrow-scope and wide-scope formulations. However, I argue that neither of them is satisfactory. The narrow-scope formulation is excessively restrictive, failing to accommodate an agent’s rational decision to abandon her end. Meanwhile, the wide-scope formulation is overly permissive, licensing wishful thinking. Consequently, I propose a middle ground by advocating the medium-scope formulation as the preferred rational requirement for MEC. Additionally, I extend my argument to formulate another requirement of practical rationality known as ‘Enkrasia.’ If these arguments prove successful, they convey an important lesson: one cannot achieve practical rationality by dropping one’s belief.
남기혁
발표 제목: The Primitivist’s Dialectic
초록: Many would agree that, in case it is shown that other things are equal, a reductive theory ought to be preferred over a non-reductive, primitivist theory. For example, it is extremely rare for one to reject the reductionist position of a given domain while conceding that the proposed reductive procedure is successful. Typically, the opposition consists in denying that the subject matter can be reduced. This suggests an unspoken rule of the dialectic that, if something can be reduced, then it should be reduced. In a similar light, conventional metaphysical wisdom tells us that primitivist positions should only be accepted as a last resort. In this talk, I argue that these two attitudes reflect some interesting features of the dialectical obligations one takes on by virtue of advocating a primitivist position. This, I argue, is not merely a psychological or sociological explanation of why these attitudes are so widespread, but instead is something that has profound implications for our epistemic evaluation of theories.
박성수
발표 제목: Against an Anti-Realist Account of Theft in Virtual Reality: Why Virtual Objects Exist
초록: This paper delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the existence of virtual objects. According to an influential anti-realist view about virtual objects, virtual objects are mere pretended game objects and therefore do not exist. I disagree with this view since I believe that there is a fundamental difference between make-believe games and virtual realities. This paper aims to clarify what this difference is and present a prima facie good argument for a realist view about virtual objects.
이병덕
발표 제목: A Kantian Critique of Benatar’s Annihilation Account
초록: Benatar argues that our lives are overall bad. But he denies that his pessimist view supports suicide, claiming that death is also bad. He defends the latter claim partly by advocating the annihilation account, which holds that one’s annihilation is an independent bad. In support of this account, he offers two reasons. His primary reason is that the annihilation of an individual thwarts their interest in continued existence. His secondary reason is that if damaging an object of value is bad, then annihilating the object is bad as well. The purpose of this paper is to argue against Benatar’s annihilation account from a Kantian point of view. For this purpose, I argue mainly for three things. First, even if one’s interest in continued existence is thwarted, this in itself does not support Benatar’s claim that one’s annihilation is an independent bad. Second, while there are situations where damaging an object of value is considered bad, the destruction of such an object in itself is not bad. In a similar vein, while there are situations where annihilating someone is considered bad, the annihilation of an individual in itself is not bad. Third, even if one’s annihilation is an independent bad, this does not provide a reason to refrain from suicide.
오시는 방법: 지하철 4호선 혜화역에서 내리셔서 1번 출구로 나온 후 전용 정류장에서 성균관대 셔틀 탑승 (400원; 교통카드 사용 가능)
발표회와 관련하여 궁금하신 점이 있으시면 아래의 연락처로 문의해 주시기 바랍니다.
철학과인문교육연구소 연구소장 이정규 / 02-760-0208 / jeonggyulee@skku.edu
철학과인문교육연구소 조교 인유림 / in.yr0805@gmail.com